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I. INTRODUCTION
In February 2011, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution1
referring the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court
(ICC). On March 3, 2011, after conducting a preliminary
investigation, the ICC Prosecutor concluded that there was a
reasonable basis to believe that crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction
had been committed in Libya and decided to open a full
investigation.2 Pursuant to the U.N. referral, and at the Prosecutor’s
request, the Pre-Trial Chamber I issued arrest warrants for Colonel
Muammar Gaddafi,3 Saif-Al Islam Gaddafi,4 and Abdullah Al-

1. S.C. Res. 1970, (Feb. 26, 2011).
2. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11, Decision on the Prosecutor’s
Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar
Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, ¶ 2 (June 27, 2011)
[hereinafter Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Prosecutor’s Application], https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2011_08499.PDF.
3. Prosecutor v. Gadafi, Case No. ICC-01/11, Warrant of Arrest for Muammar
Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-13 (June 27, 2011),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2011_08351.PDF.
4. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-14, Warrant of Arrest for SaifAl Islam Gaddafi, (June 27, 2011), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/
CR2011_08353.PDF.
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Senussi5 on charges of crimes against humanity, including
persecution and murder, allegedly committed between February 15,
2011 and at least February 28, 2011, in contravention of Article
7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute.6 The court terminated proceedings
against Colonel Muammar Gaddafi on November 22, 2011, after he
was captured and killed by National Transitional Council (NTC)
forces on October 20, 2011.7
Following an admissibility challenge by the Libyan authorities,
who sought to hold the proceedings against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi in
Libya,8 Pre-Trial Chamber I rejected the challenge and ruled that the
case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi was admissible before the ICC.9
The Chamber concluded that, “Libya had fallen short of
substantiating, by means of evidence of a sufficient degree of
specificity and probative value, that Libya’s domestic investigation
covered the same case that is before the ICC.”10 The Chamber also
underlined the Government’s inability to secure Saif Al-Islam
Gaddafi’s transfer to state custody and the significant impediments to
guaranteeing his legal representation given the security situation in
Libya.11 The Appeals Chamber confirmed the Pre-Trial Chamber I
5. Prosecutor v. Gadafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11-4, Warrant of arrest for
Abdullah Al-Senussi, (June 27, 2011), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/
CR2011_08507.PDF.
6. U.N. Support Mission Libya & U.N. High Comm’r Human Rights, Report
on the Trial of 37 Former Members of the Qadhafi Regime, 19, Case 630/2012,
(Feb. 21, 2017) [hereinafter Qadhafi Regime Report].
7. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision to Terminate
the Case Against Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, (Nov. 22, 2011),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2011_19969.PDF.
8. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Application on Behalf
of the Government of Libya Pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute (May 1,
2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_05322.PDF.
9. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision on the
Admissibility of the Case Against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, ¶ 219 (May 31, 2013),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2013_04031.PDF (stating that there is no
evidence to demonstrate Libya’s genuine capacity to investigate Gaddafi and no
overlap between the conduct being investigated in Libya and the ICC).
10. Id. ¶ 135.
11. Id. ¶¶ 174-75, 205-07, 212-15; see Qadhafi Regime Report, supra note 6, at
11-2 (explaining that Libya’s failure to secure legal representation, to capture and
surrender Qadhafi, and judicial system deficiencies further support the Pre-Trial
Chamber I determination to prosecute).
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decision on May 21, 2014.12
Libya then filed a second admissibility challenge concerning the
proceedings against Abdullah Al-Senussi.13 Pre-Trial Chamber I
issued a diverging decision and ruled that the case against Al-Senussi
was inadmissible,14 according to the principle of complementarity
enshrined in the Rome Statute.15 It found that Mr. Al-Senussi was
subject to domestic proceedings in Libya,16 and that Libya was
willing and genuinely able to carry out such proceedings.17 The
Appeals Chamber confirmed the decision on July 24, 2014.18 The
12. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11 OA 4, Judgment on the
Appeal of Libya Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 31 May 2013, ¶
215 (May 21, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_04273.PDF.
13. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Application on Behalf
of the Government of Libya Relating to Abdullah Al-Senussi Pursuant to Article
19 of the ICC Statute, (Apr. 2, 2013) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Libya
Abdullah
Al-Senussi
Application],
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/
CR2013_02635.PDF.
14. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision on the
Admissibility of the Case Against Abdullah Al-Senussi (Decision on Abdullah AlSenussi), ¶ 311 (Oct. 11, 2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/
CR2013_07445.PDF.
15. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl., art. 1, July 17,
1998.
16. See Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision on
Abdullah Al-Senussi, ¶ 311 (referring to the start of domestic proceedings later
held in Libya between March 2014-July 2015, in which the Court of Assize in
Tripoli tried and sentenced Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Abdullah Al-Senussi, and
thirty-seven other pro-Gaddafi regime officials).
17. Contra Hilmi M. Zawati, Prosecuting International Core Crimes Under
Libya’s Transitional Justice: The Case of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah AlSenussi, in JUSTICIABILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN DOMESTIC JURISDICTIONS
217, 252-53 (Alice Diver & Jacinta Miller eds., 2016) (criticising the Pre-Trial
Chamber’s conclusion that Libya was willing and genuinely able to carry out
proceedings in the case of Al-Senussi, despite Libya’s clear violations of AlSenussi’s due process rights including: depriving him of the right to appear before
a judge without undue delay; the failure to provide him with legal representation;
the lack of independence and impartiality of the Libyan judicial system; Libya’s
lack of control over detention facilities; and the lack of security and witness
protection impeding testimonies in the case of Al-Senussi.)
18. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11 OA 6, Judgment on the
Appeal of Mr Abdullah Al-Senussi Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of
11 October 2013 Entitled “Decision on the Admissibility of the Case Against
Abdullah Al-Senussi” (Judgement on Al-Senussi Appeal), ¶ 299 (July 24, 2014),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_06755.PDF.
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Pre-Trial Chamber officially closed the case on August 7, 2014.19
In assessing Libya’s willingness to prosecute under the Rome
Statute, the court held that for violations of a suspect’s due process
rights to amount to “unwillingness,” they must be “so egregious,”
that the proceedings can no longer be regarded as being capable of
providing any genuine form of justice to the suspect, so that such
proceedings are deemed to be “inconsistent with an intent to bring
the person to justice” for the purposes of Article 17(2).20 The court
did not give any definitive examples of what would constitute an
“egregious violation” in this context, but it certainly made clear that
the due process violations in Mr. Al-Senussi’s case had failed to
meet that threshold.21
This article argues that the ICC made two critical errors in the trial
of Al-Senussi. The first is that the Appeals Chamber set an
unreasonably high threshold in assessing whether violations of due
process rights render a state “unwilling” to prosecute.22 The approach
adopted by the Appeals Chamber in the Al-Senussi case will likely
undermine respect for due process rights in domestic trials, and
further delegitimize the ICC in the eyes of the public.23 As the court
is currently struggling to emerge from a legitimacy crisis following
the withdrawal of several African Union States (e.g., South Africa,
Gambia, Burundi),24 there is a risk that it will be perceived as an
institution that condones the infringement of due process rights.
The second error in the Al-Senussi case is that the Prosecutor
19. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision Following the
Declaration of Inadmissibility of the Case Against Abdullah Al-Senussi Before the
Court (Declaration of Inadmissibility Decision), ¶ 6 (Aug. 7, 2014),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_06968.PDF.
20. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11 OA 6, Judgement on AlSenussi Appeal, ¶¶ 3, 190, 230(3).
21. Id. ¶ 231 (noting that despite the absence of a clear definition for
“egregious,” the Pre-Trial Chamber correctly found that alleged violations of due
process rights are not “per se” grounds for finding unwillingness or inability).
22. Id. (agreeing with the Pre-Trial Chamber’s emphasis on scenarios described
in 17(2) or (3) of the Rome Statute as relevant indicators of unwillingness or
inability when paired with sufficient evidence).
23. See infra p. 88.
24. Aaron Maasho, African Leaders Cautiously Back Strategy to Quit Global
Court, REUTERS AFRICA (Feb. 1, 2017, 11:50 AM), http://af.reuters.com/
article/topNews/idAFKBN15G49S.
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mistakenly relied on the Appeals Chamber decision and,
subsequently, failed to challenge the admissibility judgment on
grounds that new evidence shows that the defendant’s rights were
severely compromised.25
In a statement to the author, the Prosecutor stated that,
The Office is mindful of the Appeals Chamber’s ruling that “in the
context of admissibility proceedings, the Court is not primarily called
upon to decide whether in domestic proceedings certain requirements of
human rights law or domestic law are being violated” and instead,
“what is at issue is whether the State is willing genuinely to investigate
or prosecute.”26

The Prosecutor reiterated this position to the author during a
meeting and stated that the Appeals Chamber’s ruling allows the
Prosecutor to rely on a test of “genuineness of the prosecution” and
“not the fundamental rights of the suspect or accused.”27 The
Prosecutor maintained that respecting the sovereignty of states
requires a “flexible” position regarding what constitutes due process
at the national level and fair trial standards at the international
level.28
However, the court’s interpretation of Article 17 of the Rome
Statute, as well as the Prosecutor’s failure to reverse her earlier
position on admissibility, is extremely harsh. Both errors are
untenable in light of new evidence at hand.29

25. MARK S. ELLIS, SOVEREIGNTY AND JUSTICE: BALANCING THE PRINCIPLE OF
COMPLEMENTARITY BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNALS 9 (2014) [hereinafter ELLIS, SOVEREIGNTY AND JUSTICE].
26. See Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11 OA 6, Judgement on
Al-Senussi Appeal, ¶ 190, 219 (noting that the Prosecutor also recalled the words
of the Appeals Chamber’s judgment to affirm that “the Court was not established
to be an international court of human rights, sitting in judgment over domestic
legal systems to ensure that they are compliant with international standards of
human rights.”); INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT—OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR,
THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY IN PRACTICE ¶ 49 (2003).
27. Interview with Prosecutor, in the Hague (June 29, 2016).
28. Id.
29. See infra Section III.
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II. ICC SUPPORT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF ALSENUSSI AT THE STATE LEVEL
Despite concerns regarding Libya’s justice system, the ICC Office
of the Prosecutor (OTP), from the outset, supported Libya’s
insistence to try Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Al-Senussi.30 During his
November 2011 visit to Tripoli, Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo,
the ICC’s first Prosecutor, acknowledged and supported Libya’s
NTC demands to undertake domestic trials:31
The standard of the ICC is that it has to be a judicial process that is not
organized to shield the suspect . . . and I respect that it’s important for the
cases to be tried in Libya . . . and I am not competing for the case.32

As argued by Mark Kersten, Ocampo seemingly set aside “the
orthodox standard of complementarity, whereby a state has to
convince the ICC judges that it is actively able and willing to
prosecute the same individuals for the same crimes.”33 Instead, as
argued by the Office of Public Counsel for the Defence (OPCD),
Ocampo implicitly endorsed the position of the NTC, explaining that
“[t]hey are proud, they say to me that for them it’s a matter of
national pride to show that Libyans can do the case, . . . They will
show they are able to prosecute Saif.”34
At a later date, the Prosecutor also reinforced his bias in favor of
domestic prosecution by stating that, “Libya has now established its
30. See MARK KERSTEN, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT: THE ICC IN LIBYA AND
NORTHERN UGANDA 188 (2014) (referring to OTP’s position as “unprecedented
leniency”).
31. See id. (reinforcing the idea that Moreno-Ocampo’s willingness to allow
Libya to try Saif and Senussi is further evidence of the OTP siding with Libya in
an unprecedented way).
32. Caroline Hawley, Ocampo: Saif Al-Islam Case is Huge Responsibility for
Libya, BBC (last visited July 6, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa15866040/ocampo-saif-al-islam-case-is-huge-responsibility-for-libya.
33. Kersten, supra note 30, at 188.
34. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Request to Disqualify
the Prosecutor from Participating in the Case Against Mr. Saif Al Islam Gaddafi, ¶
59 (May 3, 2012) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Request to Disqualify the
Prosecutor], https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_05388.PDF.
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government. They have the right to prosecute Saif and Senussi here.
According to our role, the primacy is for national jurisdictions. If
they conduct proceedings, the Court will not intervene.”35
Indeed, Libyan officials publicly stated their belief that the ICC
Prosecutor had endorsed their position vis-à-vis the court, and that
his collaboration helped achieve their objective.36
It seems clear that the OTP “shifted its focus” from seeking
custody of Gaddafi and Al-Senussi to framing the court’s role in
Libya as contributing to “positive complementarity.”37 Positive
complementarity not only denotes the court’s deference to national
criminal jurisdictions, but also compels the ICC to work actively to
enhance the capacity of national justice mechanisms to prosecute
crimes in a way that fulfills obligations under the Rome Statute.38 “In
contemporary practice ‘positive’ complementarity is mainly seen as a
tool to take complementarity ‘back to states.’”39
In this context, Ocampo insisted that the “ICC is still providing an
important service, because we will ensure justice in Libya, whoever
will do it.”40 Moreover, Ocampo appeared on numerous occasions
with NTC leaders, reaffirming the perception that his role was to
provide support for, rather than compete with, Libya.41 He stated that
35. Id.
36. Id. ¶¶ 60-62 (explaining how the impact of the Prosecutor’s participation
and collaboration in press conferences changed the perception as to whom should
try the case).
37. Kersten, supra note 30, at 189.
38. See Carsten Stahn, Taking Complementarity Seriously: On the Sense and
Sensibility of ‘Classical’, ‘Positive’ and ‘Negative’ Complementarity, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY: FROM THEORY TO
PRACTICE 1, 24 (Carsten Stahn & Mohamed El Zeidy eds., 2011) (stating that the
ICC mandate identifies ways for the ICC to play a limited role in strengthening
domestic courts to combat states’ “inability” to engage in domestic prosecutions).
39. Id. at 21.
40. Till Papenfuss, Interview with Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of
the International Criminal Court, IPI GLOBAL OBSERVATORY (Jan. 25, 2012),
https://theglobalobservatory.org/2012/01/interview-with-luis-moreno-ocampochief-prosecutor-of-the-international-criminal-court/.
41. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi can face trial in Libya - ICC, BBC (Nov. 22, 2011),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15831241; see also ICC Office of the
Prosecutor, Statement of the Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo to Diplomatic
Corps The Hague, Netherlands 12 February 2004, 1 (Feb. 12, 2004) (identifying
the Prosecutor’s positive approach to complementarity, and affirming that “[r]ather
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“the absence of trials before this Court, as a consequence of the
regular functioning of national institutions, would be a major
success.”42
Ocampo’s position was consistent with the Prosecutorial Strategy
of 2009–2012, which adopted a “proactive policy” to encourage
“genuine national proceedings where possible, including in situation
countries.”43
Current Chief Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, has expressed the
same sentiment.44 Bensouda followed Ocampo’s lead by declaring
that the prosecution of Gaddafi and Al-Senussi in Libya would be the
country’s “Nuremberg Movement,” implying that Libya should
conduct the trials and, consequently, “seal the primacy of the rule of
law, due process and human rights for future generations.”45 She later
declared that the court would continue to “work with the government
in trying to address as many cases as possible” and that “Libya
through its active involvement in related proceedings before the
Court is setting an example of how states can invoke
complementarity to protect their sovereign right to investigate and
prosecute their nationals.”46
In line with its focus on positive complementarity, the ICC has
exhibited a tendency to focus more on its role and ability to catalyze
than competing with national systems for jurisdiction, we will encourage national
proceedings wherever possible.”).
42. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor, ICC, Ceremony for the Solemn
Undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 2 (June
16, 2003).
43. ICC OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY 2009-2012 at
5 (2010); see also ICC OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL
STRATEGY 5 (2006) (empahisizing that the OTP adopted a positive approach to
complementarity by which the Office “encourages genuine national proceedings
where possible; relies on national and international networks; and participates in a
system of international cooperation.”).
44. See ICC OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, STRATEGIC PLAN 2016-2018 (2015)
(continuing the policy to support and domestic proceedings when possible).
45. Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor of the ICC, Speech in New York, Statement to
the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in Libya, Pursuant to UNSCR
1970 (2011), ¶ 11 (May 8, 2013).
46. See Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor of the ICC, Speech in New York, ICC
Prosecutor Statement to the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in
Libya, Pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011), (Nov. 14, 2013).
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domestic prosecutions, rather than ensuring adherence to
international standards of fairness at the domestic level.47 The
problem is that the ICC’s endorsement of positive complementarity
never really envisaged domestic trials of an irregular and
dysfunctional nature, where the accused might suffer due process
violations.48 The drafters of the Rome Statute were much more
concerned about states shielding former leaders from
accountability.49 In reality, however, many states are all too willing
to prosecute members of a former regime.50 This is the “shadow side
to complementarity.”51
Not surprisingly, other organs of the court disagreed with the
OTP’s approach.52 The OPCD questioned the Prosecutor’s
acquiescence to Libya’s desire to prosecute Gaddafi and AlSenussi.53 The OPCD also took issue with Ocampo’s public
comments and appearances with NTC members. In May 2012, the
47. See Mark Kersten, Hold Your Horses, ICC Complementarity, JUSTICE IN
CONFLICT (June 21, 2016), https://justiceinconflict.org/2016/06/21/hold-yourhorses-icc-complementarity/ (considering the effects of the ICC’s turn toward
positive complementarityin supporting state action).
48. Nidal Nabil Jurdi, The Complementary Regime of the International
Criminal Court in Practice: Is It Truly Serving the Purpose? Some Lessons from
Libya, 11 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 199, 210 (2017) (reinforcing the idea that the
international community initially perceived positive complementarity to be based
on two pillars: respect for the primary jurisdiction of states to domestically
prosecute international crimes, and considerations of efficiency and effectiveness).
49. See id. (explaining that, for example, the British proposal within the
Preparatory Committee of the Rome Statute advocated for allowing the ICC to
consider aspects of fairness in the domestic proceedings revealing an emerging
consensus on the Committee tolimitthe role of the ICC to only cases where
national authorities were carrying out or had carried out ‘sham’ proceedings’
intended to shield criminals from accountability).
50. See Frédéric Mégret & Marika Giles Samson, Holding the Line on
Complementarity in Libya: The Case for Tolerating Flawed Domestic Trials, 11 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 571, 572 (2013) (considering the case of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi
and Abdullh Al-Senussi as prime examples of a state being “too willing” to
prosecute).
51. Kevin J. Heller, The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Effect of Article
17 of the Rome Statute on National Due Process, 17 CRIM. L. F. 255, 255 (2006)
(referring to the low likelihood that former members’ due process rights will be
respected in national proceedings).
52. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Request to Disqualify the Prosecutor, supra note 34,
¶ 27.
53. Id. ¶ 28.
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OPCD filed a motion with the ICC’s Appeals Chamber to disqualify
Ocampo from the Libyan case due to “an objective appearance that
the Prosecutor is affiliated with both the political cause and legal
positions of the NTC government.”54 Although the motion was
unsuccessful, the Appeals Chamber issued a scathing ruling,
claiming that,
[The Prosecutor’s] behavior was clearly inappropriate in light of the
presumption of innocence. Such behavior not only reflects badly on the
Prosecutor but also, given the Prosecutor is an elected official of the Court
and that his statements are often imputed to the Court as a whole, may
lead observers to question the integrity of the Court as a whole.55

The Prosecutor’s attitude toward the Al-Senussi case, at least
publicly, was therefore an extension of the OTP’s championship of
positive complementarity. By encouraging Libya’s domestic
proceedings despite dramatic evidence of flaws in the system, the
OTP weakened accountability for crimes in Libya and contributed to
the ICC’s ongoing legitimacy crisis.

III. APPEALS CHAMBER JUDGMENT IN
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ABDULLAH ALSENUSSI
On July 24, 2014, the Appeals Chamber upheld Pre-Trial Chamber
I’s earlier decision that the case against Abdullah Al-Senussi was
inadmissible.56 In its reasoning, the Appeals Chamber concentrated
on the meaning of “unwillingness” as defined by Article 17(2) of the
Rome Statute.57
Taking into account the text, context, object, and purpose of
Article 17(2), the Appeals Chamber held that a determination of
unwillingness derives from proceedings which are “being conducted
54. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Request to Disqualify the Prosecutor, supra note 34,
¶ 28.
55. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11 OA 3, Decision on the
Request for Disqualification of the Prosecutor, ¶ 33 (June 12, 2012),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_06724.PDF.
56. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11 OA 6, Judgment on the
Appeal of Mr Abdullah Al-Senussi, ¶ 299.
57. Id. ¶ 218.
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in a manner . . . inconsistent with an intent to bring the person
concerned to justice” as set out in Article 17(2)(c) of the Rome
Statute and is not one that involves an assessment of whether the due
process rights of a suspect have been breached per se.58
The Appeals Chamber argued that “unwillingness” should
generally be understood as a state’s lack of genuine willingness to
investigate or prosecute, such that proceedings might lead to a
suspect evading justice.59 This is provided for specifically in Article
17(2)(a), according to which the court shall consider whether the
proceedings were or are being undertaken for the purpose of
shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility.60
The Appeals Chamber also argued that although human rights
standards may assist the court in its evaluation of the criteria
described in Article 17(2)(c) (e.g., “conducted independently and
impartially,” “an intent to bring the person concerned to justice”), the
primary focus is not whether the suspect’s rights have been violated,
but whether the domestic proceedings are being conducted in a
manner that might permit a suspect to evade justice.61 To be fair,
despite the court’s view that there is an absence of formal “fair trial”
or “due process” requirements in the text of the Rome Statute, it did
not completely sever the link between fair trial requirements and
admissibility challenges.62
It is true that the court characterized a state challenge to ICC
admissibility as “primarily a question of forum” focused on “the
relationship between [s]tates and the court.”63 However, the Appeals
Chamber agreed that the lack of “due process” requirements “does
not mean ‘that the court must turn a blind eye to clear and conclusive
evidence demonstrating that national proceedings completely lack
fairness.’”64 In fact, the court considered a spectrum of unfair
58. Id. ¶ 230(2).
59. Id. ¶ 218.
60. Id.
61. See Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11 OA 6, Judgment on
the Appeal of Mr Abdullah Al-Senussi, ¶¶ 220-21 (indicating that the provision is
not primarily concerned with whether the rights of the suspect are being violated).
62. Id.
63. Id. ¶ 169.
64. Id. ¶ 229.
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proceedings that it could not countenance finding inadmissible in the
context of Article 17(2)(c):
At its most extreme, the Appeals Chamber would not envisage
proceedings that are, in reality, little more than a predetermined prelude to
an execution, and which are therefore contrary to even the most basic
understanding of justice, as being sufficient to render a case inadmissible.
Other less extreme instances may arise when the violations of the rights of
the suspect are so egregious that it is clear that the international
community would not accept that the accused was being brought to any
genuine form of justice. In such circumstances, it is even arguable that a
State is not genuinely investigating or prosecuting at all.65

Thus, the court did envisage an exception; a threshold at which
due process violations would be “so egregious” that one can
realistically say there is no “genuine form of justice” and which
would thus compel a finding of unwillingness to prosecute at the
domestic level.66 In essence, depending on the facts of the individual
case, there may be circumstances whereby violations of a suspect’s
rights are so egregious that the proceedings can no longer be
regarded as providing any genuine form of justice. In these
circumstances, the case would be “inconsistent with an intent to
bring the person to justice.”67
However, the court’s understanding of egregious violations is still
unclear and contestable. In its decision, the court provided no clear
example of the type of violations that would qualify as “egregious”
for the purposes of admissibility proceedings.68 Yet, it still
determined that the alleged violations of due process rights in AlSenussi’s case were not sufficiently “egregious” to suggest Libya’s
unwillingness to prosecute.69 Considering the due process violations
that occurred during the Libyan trials, as outlined below, the
65. Id. ¶ 230.
66. Id. ¶ 230
67. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11 OA 6, Judgment on the
Appeal of Mr Abdullah Al-Senussi, ¶ 3.
68. See Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11 OA 6, Judgment on
the Appeal of Mr Abdullah Al-Senussi, ¶ 230 (asserting that finding violation to be
egregious will depend on the facts).
69. Id. ¶ 191 (arguing that while a lack of access to counsel may be a violation
of Al-Senussi’s rights, it does not meet the threshold needed to prove Libya is
unwilling to prosecute).
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threshold used by the court was either too high or the facts of the
case were improperly evaluated.70
When the court ruled the Al-Senussi case inadmissible, it had
knowledge of early indications that the fairness of the trial process
was questionable, including the lack of counsel for Al-Senussi.71 The
Appeals Chamber did accept that this could potentially undermine
the fairness of the proceedings in the future.72
As noted below, “the future” envisioned by the Appeals Chamber
in its judgment on admissibility has now fully materialized.73 Yet, the
ICC Prosecutor has failed to exercise the power conferred on her by
the Rome Statute to renew the court’s admissibility decision.74

IV. DOMESTIC PROCEEDINGS: NEW EVIDENCE
OF EGREGIOUS DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS
Between March 2014 and July 2015, thirty-seven Gaddafi-era
officials, including Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi,
were tried on charges of war crimes and other offences.75 Both
Gaddafi and Al-Senussi (and several other defendants) were
sentenced to death at Tripoli’s Court of Assize, following what the
international community has characterized as an unfair trial.76
70. See infra Part III (detailing due process violations including lack of
transparency during the proceedings, lack of access to adequate legal
representation, and insufficient security).
71. See Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11 OA 6, Judgment on
the Appeal of Mr Abdullah Al-Senussi, ¶ 190 (accepting the fact that there had
been a problem finding Mr. Al-Senussi proper legal counsel but rejecting the
argument that a lack of counsel renders the entire proceeding prejudiced).
72. Id. ¶ 198.
73. See infra Part III.
74. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 15,
art.19(10) (“The Prosecutor may submit a request for a review of the decision
when he or she is fully satisfied that new facts have arisen which negate the basis
on which the case had previously been found inadmissible under article 17.”).
75. See generally Qadhafi Regime Report, supra note 6, at 18 (describing the
trial process of former Gaddafi officials).
76. See Human Rights Watch, Libya: Flawed Trial of Gaddafi Officials:
Defendants Alleged Limited Access to Lawyers, Ill-Treatment, (July 28, 2015, 5:49
AM) [hereinafter Libya: Flawed Trial of Gaddafi Officials], https://www.hrw.org/
news/2015/07/28/libya-flawed-trial-gaddafi-officials (calling for the Supreme
Court of Libya to “fully review the verdict” and “overturn the death sentences”

ss

ridan Pre

The She

2017]

BEYOND A FLAWED TRIAL

89

Subsequent reports and investigations into the fairness of the
domestic trial proceedings revealed that defendants’ due process
rights were severely compromised and that the trials failed to comply
with international human rights law.77 Even though independent
observation had been limited from the outset, relevant reports
highlighted that the justice system in Libya was generally
“dysfunctional” and “ineffective,” and the regime trials were marked
by serious violations of due process.78
Lack of transparency was one of the major flaws in the trial
process. International fair trial standards require hearings to be
public, to ensure transparency of proceedings and serve as a
safeguard for defendants.79 However, an in-depth review of trial
procedures by the International Bar Association (IBA), found several
obstacles that created a de facto barrier to public access.80 “Security
guards in the court complex had wide, if not unchecked, discretion to
deny entry” into the specially designated courtroom in the Al-Hadba
Corrections Facility in Tripoli.81 Lawyers informed the United
Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) that the presence of
prison guards in the courtroom created an intimidating atmosphere,
which deterred defendants from raising concerns regarding their

based on allegations of unfair trial practices).
77. International Bar Association, New Report Finds Libyan Regime Trial
Compromised,
(Nov.
30,
2015),
https://www.ibanet.org/
Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=759f1431-4e10-450d-998e-21349fd8bf26.
78. See Amnesty International, Libya 2016/2017, (last visited July 19, 2017),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/libya/reportlibya (reporting on the general collapse of the justice system marked with
inefficiency and high numbers of pre-trial detainees); Libya: Flawed Trial of
Gaddafi Officials, supra note 76 (detailing the human rights violations obscuring
the trial process).
79. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/GC/32 (Aug. 23, 2007) (“[A]ll trials in criminal matters or related to a
suit at law must in principle be conducted orally and publicly. The publicity of
hearings ensures the transparency of proceedings and thus provides an important
safeguard for the interest of the individual and of the society at large.”); Libya:
Flawed Trial of Gaddafi Officials, supra note 76.
80. MARK S. ELLIS, TRIAL OF THE LIBYAN REGIME: AN INVESTIGATION INTO
INTERNATIONAL FAIR TRIAL STANDARDS 17 (2015) [hereinafter TRIAL OF THE
LIBYAN REGIME].
81. Id. at 17.
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treatment and other abuses in detention,82 in addition to dissuading
some lawyers from visiting their clients more frequently.83 The fact
that trials were being held in a courtroom created inside a compound
controlled by an armed group also discouraged defense witnesses
from coming forth and giving testimony in favor of senior former
regime officials.84
Moreover, both domestic and international NGOs were often
either expressly barred from entering, or were later rejected access
by security personnel after previous visits.85 For instance, Human
Rights Watch and Amnesty International reportedly attended only
one trial session and were not allowed to observe additional sessions
by prison authorities.86 Two representatives from the NGO No Peace
Without Justice were asked to leave the court while attending a
hearing in March 2015, then escorted out of the courtroom and held
in a nearby building where they were questioned for several hours
before being released later that day.87
Observers from UNSMIL were the only members of the public
allowed in the courtroom for the first two sessions.88 In May 2014, an
international U.N. staff member was briefly detained by the
authorities at the Al-Hadba Corrections Facility on “allegations of
sorcery.”89 In response, UNSMIL briefly suspended its trial

82. Qadhafi Regime Report, supra note 6, at 21, 40.
83. Id. at 40.
84. Id. at 22 (finding that members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group,
which opposed the Gaddafi regime prior to the 2011 uprising as well as during the
war, are currently mostly members of an armed group called ‘National Guard,’
which physically controls the Al-Hadba compound).
85. See Trial of The Libyan Regime, supra note 80, at 19; Libya: Flawed Trial
of Gaddafi Officials, supra note 76.
86. Amnesty International, ICC Decision to Allow Abdallah Al-Senussi to
Stand Trial in Libya ‘Deeply Alarming’ Amidst Security Vacuum, (July 24, 2014),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ior53/008/2014/en/; Libya: Flawed Trial
of Gaddafi Officials, supra note 76.
87. Qadhafi Regime Report, supra note 6, at 35.
88. Id. at 5 (“UNSMIL monitored Case 630/2012 from the pre-trial phase until
the first instance verdict was delivered in July 2015. UNSMIL staff attended in
person the first six hearings”).
89. Amnesty International, ICC Decision to Allow Abdallah Al-Senussi to
Stand Trial, supra note 86; see also Qadhafi Regime Report, supra note 6, at 35.
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observations. 90 On another occasion, an UNSMIL staff member was
arbitrarily asked to leave the courtroom.91 In July 2014, UNSMIL
temporarily withdrew from Libya, citing security concerns.92 Having
relocated in Tunis, the UN Mission continued to monitor the trial
remotely via television broadcasts, although programming was
sometimes interrupted and the hearings were often not transmitted in
their entirety.93
As reported by Human Rights Watch, foreign journalists covering
the trial reported that they were sometimes refused access to AlHadba,94 and that the process for obtaining permission to enter the
trial facility was opaque and subject to frequent changes.95 Some
foreign and Libyan female journalists were denied access
altogether,96 or were asked to cover their heads as a condition of
entry into the facility.97 The Libyan authorities only allowed news
networks considered sympathetic to the government in Tripoli,
including Al Jazeera and the local al-Nabaa television station, to
broadcast trial sessions live.98
Despite the shroud of secrecy surrounding the trial proceedings,
concerns of due process violations were expressed by a number of
entities, including: The Office of the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights,99 UNSMIL,100 Human Rights Watch,101 Amnesty
90. Libya: Flawed Trial of Gaddafi Officials, supra note 76.
91. Qadhafi Regime Report, supra note 6, at 35.
92. Libya: Flawed Trial of Gaddafi Officials, supra note 76.
93. Libya: Flawed Trial of Gaddafi Officials, supra note 76; see Trial of The
Libyan Regime, supra note 80, at 18 (explaining that Libyan law deems a trial
“open” if it is broadcast but noting that most broadcasts are limited or interrupted).
94. Libya: Flawed Trial of Gadhafi Officials, supra note 76.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Qadhafi Regime Report, supra note 6, at 35.
98. Libya: Flawed Trial of Gaddafi Officials, supra note 76.
99. See UN News Centre, UN Human Rights Officials Seriously Concerned by
Verdicts in Trial of Former Members of the Gaddafi Regime, (July 28, 2015),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51514#.WWFqIsaZOqA
(expressing concern that some defendants were missing from some sessions and
that there was no effort to establish individual criminal responsibility through
evidence).
100. See United Nations Support Mission in Libya, Concerns About Verdict in
Trial of Former Qadhafi-Era Officials, (July 28, 2015), https://unsmil.
unmissions.org/concerns-about-verdict-trial-former-qadhafi-era-officials
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International,102 the IBA,103 the International Commission of
Jurists,104 No Peace Without Justice,105 and Lawyers for Justice in
Libya.106

A. LACK OF EFFECTIVE AND COMPETENT DOMESTIC LEGAL
REPRESENTATION
Even with limited independent observation of the trials, it was
clear that Al-Senussi did not receive any meaningful legal
representation.107 Based on a number of relevant reports, limited
(expressing concern regarding defendants being denied access to lawyers for
prolonged periods of time).
101. See Libya: Flawed Trial of Gaddafi Officials, supra note 76 (calling for a
Libyan Supreme Court review of the proceedings to reveal possible unfair trial
practices).
102. See Amnesty International, Libya: Flawed Trial of Al-Gaddafi Officials
Leads to Appalling Death Sentences, (July 28, 2015, 12:24 PM),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/07/libya-flawed-trial-of-al-gaddafiofficials/ (expressing concern over the defense counsel’s inability to cross-examine
witnesses and limited ability to call witnesses).
103. See International Bar Association, Libya’s Trial of Former Regime
Members Prompt Serious Concern, (July 28, 2015), https://www.ibanet.org/
Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=3eedd48e-d005-411e-b237-1794e56e22cf
(expressing concern about the lack of transparency that occurred during the
proceedings).
104. See International Commission of Jurists, Libya: Unfair Trial of Saif AlIslam Gadhafi and Others a Missed Opportunity to Establish Truth, Violates Right
to Life, (July 28, 2015), https://www.icj.org/libya-unfair-trial-of-saif-al-islamgadhafi-and-others-a-missed-opportunity-to-establish-truth-violates-right-to-life/
(expressing concern that the fair trial guarantees required by Article 14 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights were not adequately
respected).
105. See No Peace Without Justice, Libya’s Missed Opportunity: Flawed
Penalties Follow Flawed Trials, (July 28, 2015), http://www.npwj.org/ICC/
Libya’s-missed-opportunity-flawed-penalties-follow-flawed-trials.html (indicating
that due process was violated by not allowing defendants access to lawyers).
106. Lawyers for Justice In Libya, LFJL is Concerned that the Absence of Fair
Trial Standards During the Gaddafi Official Trials Will Jeopardize the Right of
Victims to Justice, (July 29, 2015), http://www.libyanjustice.org/news/news/
post/201-lawyers-for-justice-in-libya-lfjl-is-concerned-that-the-absence-of-fairtrial-standards-during-gaddafi-official-trials-will-jeopardise-the-right-of-victimsto-justice (expressing concern about the transparency of the proceedings and their
inaccessibility to independent observers).
107. See Qadhafi Regime Report, supra note 6, at 36-37 (detailing accounts of
defendants’ limited access to counsel, attempts to intimidate counsel, and counsel
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access to counsel, intermittent legal representation, lack of access to
defense files, and lack of sufficient time to prepare a defense and
present witnesses significantly undermined the fairness of AlSenussi’s proceedings.108
Despite the fact that Al-Senussi was charged with serious crimes
that stipulated the death penalty, he had no legal representation
during his interrogation and pre-trial hearing.109 Full respect for fair
trial guarantees is even more important when the imposition of the
capital penalty is at stake.110 In this regard, the United Nations
Human Rights Committee stated that:
[i]n cases of trials leading to the imposition of the death penalty
scrupulous respect of the guarantees of fair trial is particularly important.
The imposition of a sentence of death upon conclusion of a trial, in which
the provision of Article 14 of the Covenant [ICCPR] have not been
respected, constitutes a violation of the right to life (Article 6 of the
Covenant).111

The Committee further specified that, “in cases involving capital
punishment, it is axiomatic that the accused must be effectively
assisted by a lawyer at all stages of the proceedings.”112 Yet, under
Libya’s own Code of Criminal Procedure (Article 54 of the Libyan
Prisons Law No. 47), the state must allow a detainee access to a

having limited access to witnesses and evidence).
108. Id.; see Human Rights Watch, Libya: Ensure Abdallah Sanussi Access to
Lawyer: Gaddafi’s Intelligence Chief Discusses Jail Conditions, Concern, (Apr.
17, 2013, 5:41 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/17/Libya-ensureabdallah-sanussi-access-lawyer (noting that Al-Senussi requested a lawyer almost
immediately after returning to Libya).
109. Human Rights Watch, Libya: Gaddafi Son, Ex-Officials, Held Without Due
Process, (Feb. 13, 2014, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/13/libyagaddafi-son-ex-officials-held-without-due-process.
110. INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, THE DEATH PENALTY UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A BACKGROUND PAPER TO THE IBAHRI RESOLUTION ON
THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY 4 (2008).
111. Human Rights Committee, supra note 79, ¶ 59.
112. Id. ¶ 38; see Aliev v. Ukraine, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 7.3 (2003); Human Rights
Committee, Aliboeva v. Tajikistan, ¶ 6.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/985/2001
(2005); Human Rights Committee, Saidova v. Tajikistan, ¶ 6.8, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/81/D/964/2001 (July 8, 2004); Human Rights Committee, LaVende v.
Trinidad and Tobago, ¶ 58, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/61/D/554/1993 (Nov. 17, 1997).
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lawyer during an investigation if the detainee requests one.113
However, Al-Senussi and other former Gaddafi officials’ right to
legal assistance before Libyan courts was not adequately protected in
law or in practice, allowing pre-trial interrogations to proceed
without the presence of a defense lawyer.114
During a prison visit by Human Rights Watch at the Tripoli AlHadba Corrections Facility on April 15, 2013, Al-Senussi revealed
that he had no access to a lawyer after being extradited from
Mauritania in September 2012.115 Al-Senussi himself reported that he
had been taken before a judge about once a month to review his
detention, and each time the judge extended his detention.116 At each
appearance, Al-Senussi asked the judge for a lawyer.117 Al-Senussi
consistently alleged that he did not have a lawyer for his pre-trial
hearings.118 He told Human Rights Watch that during his
interrogation, officials would not allow him to have a lawyer present,
would not reveal his interrogators’ identities, and denied him both
the right to remain silent and the opportunity to review the evidence
against him; all of this in violation of Article 106 of the Libyan Code
of Criminal Procedure.119
In its admissibility decision of October 11, 2013, the ICC PreTrial Chamber acknowledged that up until that moment, Al-Senussi
was yet to appoint—or have appointed—a lawyer in the domestic
proceedings, despite the fact that he was entitled to legal
representation pursuant to Article 106 of the Libyan Code of
Criminal Procedure.120 This was also patently in contrast with the
Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers pursuant to which
113. Libya Code Crim. Proc., art. 54.
114. Qadhafi Regime Report, supra note 6, at 37.
115. Human Rights Watch, Libya: Ensure Abdallah Sanussi Access to Lawyer,
supra note 108.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Human Rights Watch, Libya: Gaddafi Son, Ex-Officials, Held Without Due
Process, supra note 109.
119. Id.
120. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision on Abdullah
Al-Senussi, ¶¶ 232, 304 (admitting that the sensitivity of the case has created a
delay in appointing a lawyer for Al-Senussi but assuring that a lawyer will be
appointed by Accusation Chamber in the “very near future”).
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“Governments shall further ensure that all persons arrested or
detained, with or without criminal charge, shall have prompt access
to a lawyer, and in any case not later than forty-eight hours from the
time of arrest or detention.”121
Remarkably, Al-Senussi was unaware of the lawyer representing
him in his admissibility case to the ICC.122 Although the ICC judge
had asked Libya to arrange privileged visits between Al-Senussi and
his lawyers, no meeting ever took place.123 In its submission to the
ICC on April 2, 2013, Libya attributed the delay to its recent
replacement of the general prosecutor and said it would address the
issue of legal access for Al-Senussi “as a matter of priority.”124
However, Al-Senussi’s lawyers argued before the ICC that Libya had
ignored the ICC judge’s order requiring a visit by the lawyers
engaged to represent him.125
The Pre-Trial Chamber noted that,
the problem of legal representation, while not compelling at the present
time, holds the potential to become a fatal obstacle to the progress of the
case. Indeed . . . according to the Libyan national justice system, trial
proceedings cannot be conducted in the absence of a lawyer for the
suspect.126

Oddly enough, although the Chamber openly acknowledged the
failure of the Libyan Government to appoint an attorney to represent
Al-Senussi, it did not consider that fact to be fatal to Libya’s
admissibility challenge.127
121. Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, princ. 7 (1990),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/RoleOfLawyers.aspx.
122. Human Rights Watch, Libya: Ensure Abdallah Sanussi Access to Lawyer,
supra note 108.
123. Id.
124. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Libya Abdullah Al-Senussi Application, supra note
13, ¶ 53.
125. Libya: Flawed Trial of Gaddafi Officials, supra note 76.
126. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision on Abdullah
Al-Senussi ¶ 307.
127. Kevin Jon Heller, PTC I’s Inconsistent Approach to Complementarity and
the Right to Counsel, OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 12, 2013, 10:43 PM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/10/12/ptc-inconsistent-approach-right-counsel/ (noting
that inconsistency affecting the Pre-Trial Chamber admissibility decisions in the
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While the ICC envisaged that Al-Senussi would receive legal
representation at trial, trial observers informed the IBA that AlSenussi’s representation was inconsistent.128 It appears that “all the
defendants in the case were eventually represented by defense
counsel a few sessions into the trial — either retained by their
families or appointed by the court.”129 The majority of the defendants
complained of insufficient access to defense counsels and difficulties
of confidentially consulting and communicating with their lawyers.130
Moreover, it was impossible for several high-profile defendants to
retain the same defense counsels throughout the trial, possibly due to
threats and intimidation faced by those lawyers.131 It was also
reported by the IBA that Al-Senussi’s original lawyer, “a wellknown Libyan defense attorney, recused himself for medical reasons
following a leg injury.”132
One Tunisian lawyer representing Al-Senussi early on, Leila Ben
Debba, indicated that she was “unable to obtain the accreditation
from the Libyan Bar Association needed to officially meet with her
clients and represent them in court. The lack of accreditation also
prevented her from accessing the case materials.”133 This type of
interference frequently occurs in domestic war crimes proceedings.134
Ben Debba said she only managed to attend “a few trial sessions
unofficially through personal connections.”135 She was never able to
meet with Al-Senussi in private and never discussed the case with
Gaddafi and Al-Senussi cases is undeniable.
128. TRIAL OF THE LIBYAN REGIME, supra note 80, at 34.
129. Id. at 33; Libya: Flawed Trial of Gaddafi Officials, supra note 76.
130. Qadhafi Regime Report, supra note 6, at 23-24, 40 (noting that the Libyan
Code of Criminal Procedure allows the Public Prosecution or investigating judge
to prohibit communication between the accused and other inmates or visitors,
“without prejudice to the right of the accused to always contact his attorney
without the presence of anyone.”)
131. Id., at 3, 25 (stating that a number of defendants were not represented
during hearings before the Accusation Chamber in Tripoli and that the indictment
hearings before the Chamber appear to have been the first time many defendants
had access to a lawyer in September and October 2013, some of whom remained
without any legal representation for several hearings of the trial itself).
132. TRIAL OF THE LIBYAN REGIME, supra note 80, at 34.
133. Libya: Flawed Trial of Gaddafi Officials, supra note 76.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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him.136 When conflict broke out in Tripoli in July 2014, Ben Debba
stopped traveling to Libya.137
Al-Senussi was eventually appointed a public defender but as
reported by the IBA, he reportedly claimed that no Libyan lawyer
was willing to take on his defense.138 Allegedly, he wanted to be
turned over to the ICC, or to be assigned international counsel.139
According to reports by trial observers, Al-Senussi was appointed a
counsel by the court, as his counsel of choice was not available.140
There is no information concerning the preferences of the other
defendants regarding counsel or how much time, if any, they were
given to secure counsel of choice before being appointed a public
defender.141
Moreover, there were additional issues further undermining AlSenussi’s already limited legal representation, including court
authorities preventing him from speaking freely during the
proceedings, and Al-Senussi inability to call in or question
witnesses.142 He also claimed that armed groups had intimidated his
lawyers.143 Al-Senussi’s former lawyer Ahmed Nashad also claimed
that a guard was present in the room whenever he met with his
client.144 However, he also said that “the trial was not politicized and
was conducted in a normal and professional manner,” and that “the
Court was very accommodating to our needs.”145
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. TRIAL OF THE LIBYAN REGIME, supra note 80, at 34.
139. Id.; see Qadhafi Regime Report, supra note 6, at 38 (detailing how the
security situation in Libya and the political sensitivity of the case may have limited
the number of experienced lawyers willing to represent former Gaddafi-era
officials, especially high-profile defendants like Al-Senussi, who subsequently
expressed an interest in being tried by foreign lawyers).
140. TRIAL OF THE LIBYAN REGIME, supra note 80, at 34.
141. Id.
142. Libya: Flawed Trial of Gaddafi Officials, supra note 76; Human Rights
Watch, Libya: Gaddafi Son, Ex-Officials, Held Without Due Process, supra note
109.
143. Libya: Flawed Trial of Gaddafi Officials, supra note 76.
144. Id.
145. Emadeddin Zahri Muntasser, Libyans Have Earned the Right to Justice,
HUFFINGTON POST (last visited July 20, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
emadeddin-zahri-muntasser-/libyans-justice-gaddafi_b_8005992.html.
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There was a common complaint among defense lawyers
participating in the trial that they lacked time to review the case
materials and to identify and bring to court witnesses located in
different parts of the country.146 One of the defense attorneys
affirmed that lawyers present for other defendants at trial were not
able to review the more than 4,000 pages of testimony and 70,000
pages of evidence and statements submitted by the prosecution,
although they had requested it.147 Lawyers who did receive a full
accusation file complained about the lack of adequate time to
investigate or respond to all the prosecution’s evidence.148 During the
hearings, no prosecution witnesses testified in court, whereas the
defendants’ right to call and examine witnesses on their behalf was
hindered by the court’s decision to allow only two witnesses per
defendant.149 Ahmed Nashad indicated he had not been able to secure
the physical presence of any witnesses on behalf of Al-Senussi due
to fear of reprisals and a lack of witness protection programs.150 He
was forced to submit several written statements from people who
refused to attend the trial due to security concerns.151
These issues, coupled with a lack of full and timely access to the
complete case file against the accused and defense concerns over
lack of time to prepare and present witnesses, diminished the
possibility of any meaningful legal representation for Al-Senussi.152
In fact, on the day of the verdict, July 28, 2015, the Ministry of
Justice in the government of Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni
issued a statement calling the verdict “null and void, arguing that the
judges were under duress and the defendants’ conditions of detention
146. Libya: Flawed Trial of Gaddafi Officials, supra note 76.
147. Human Rights Watch, Libya: Gaddafi Son, Ex-Officials, Held Without Due
Process, supra note 109.
148. Qadhafi Regime Report, supra note 6, at 41.
149. Id. at 44.
150. Libya: Flawed Trial of Gaddafi Officials, supra note 76.
151. Id.; see also Qadhafi Regime Report, supra note 6, at 45 (discussing the
lawyers’ concerns regarding difficulties in bringing witnesses to court, including
those residing abroad or in other parts of Libya with Al-Senussi’s lawyer
particularly complaining that he was unable to have a witness testimony certified at
the Libyan consulate in Egypt, and that the Court did not take any measures to
facilitate the testimony or to ensure that the Libyan consulate in Cairo would
certify it).
152. Amnesty International, Libya: Flawed Trail of Al-Gaddafi, supra note 102.
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and insufficient access to lawyers” foreclosed the possibility of a fair
verdict.153 This followed a previous statement by the Minister of
Justice affirming that it was impossible to issue fair and independent
verdicts given the tense security situation prevailing in western
Libya, which he described as under the control of armed groups.154

B. LACK OF SECURITY SURROUNDING THE LIBYAN JUDICIAL
SYSTEM
1. Violence Surrounding Proceedings
During Al-Senussi’s pre-trial hearing by the ICC, the Defense’s
now prescient assertion that “the pressure on the Libyan judiciary is
such that the only possible outcome of national proceedings in Libya
will be Mr. Al-Senussi’s conviction and execution,” was then
deemed to be speculative and unsubstantiated.155 Despite the fact that
reports from international news media and NGOs continued to
indicate that such assertions were well founded, the Appeals
Chamber again refused to reconsider the Pre-Trial Chamber’s factual
finding on the security situation in Libya.156 Indeed, reports from
Libya amply document the government’s lack of effective control
over detention facilities and its inability to protect judicial staff.157
Armed militias posed insurmountable obstacles to a fully functioning
Libyan judiciary, including intimidation of witnesses and threats and
acts of violence against judicial actors.158
As early as the Pre-Trial Chamber ruling in October 2013, Judge
Van den Wyngaert worried whether Libya’s security problem
compromised Libya’s ability to prosecute Al-Senussi through its
national courts. She stated:
I cannot help but note the widely reported abduction and release of
153. Qadhafi Regime Report, supra note 6, at 50.
154. Id.
155. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11 OA 6, Judgement on AlSenussi Appeal, ¶ 244(b).
156. Id. ¶¶ 276, 280-81.
157. Qadhafi Regime Report, supra note 6, at 9.
158. Id.; INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, CHALLENGES FOR THE
LIBYAN JUDICIARY: ENSURING INDEPENDENCE, ACCOUNTABILITY AND GENDER
EQUALITY 20 (2016).
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Libyan Prime Minister on 10 October 2013. It is unclear, at this point in
time, what effect these events might have on the already precarious
security situation in Libya. Further deterioration of the security situation
could extend to Mr. Al-Senussi’s legal proceedings, and, accordingly,
affect Libya’s ability to carry out those proceedings . . . Prior to ruling on
the present challenge, I would have preferred to seek submissions from
the parties and participants as to whether Libya’s security situation
remains sufficiently stable to carry out criminal proceedings against Mr.
Al-Senussi.159

However, in a clear omission, the court did not pause to consider
the significance of the abduction of the Libyan Prime Minister,
which occurred the day before the court’s decision.160
Furthermore, the Defense brought several NGO reports and media
articles to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s attention showing that
government authorities, local prosecutors, and judges faced security
threats.161 In particular, Taha Bara, the Deputy Prosecutor assigned to
Al-Senussi’s case, was allegedly abducted and abused by militia
groups in May 2013.162 Once again, the court did not attach due
importance to this event, and simplistically found that there was no
proof of any link between the abduction and the proceedings against
Al-Senussi.163
Following the pre-trial ruling, the security situation in Libya
deteriorated dramatically.164 As militia infighting spread across
Libyan territory, there was a major escalation of violence and near
total collapse of the rule of law in parts of the country.165 Libya
gradually became entangled in a violent power struggle largely
between two competing governments—the General National
159. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-466-Anx, Declaration of Judge
Christine Van den Wyngaert, ¶ 2 (Nov. 10, 2013), https://www.icccpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2013_07447.PDF.
160. ELLIS, SOVEREIGNTY AND JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 218.
161. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11 OA 6, Judgement on AlSenussi Appeal, ¶ 276 (sharing one viewpoint with the Office of the Prosecutor on
this subject).
162. Id. ¶ 273.
163. Id. ¶¶ 273-75.
164. Amnesty International, ICC Decision to Allow Abdallah Al-Senussi to
Stand Trial, supra note 86.
165. Id.
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Congress allied with the pro-Islamist “Libya Dawn” militias, and the
elected, internationally recognized, House of Representatives allied
with the forces of Gaddafi-era defector, General Haftar.166 By July
2014, Libya’s Foreign Minister, Mohamed Abdelaziz, openly
admitted that the central government was too weak to control the
country’s militias.167
By 2015, Libya was engulfed in civil war.168 Libya Dawn militias
seized Tripoli and the internationally recognized government
retreated to the Eastern towns of Beida and Tobruk.169 Haftar’s
government had no control over the trial process and the Justice
Minister openly condemned the continuation of proceedings in
Tripoli.170
Despite these extraordinary events and the fact that Libya Dawn
militias controlled Tripoli, the ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda,
insisted there was no evidence that the case against Al-Senussi had
been affected.171 In a letter to Al-Senussi’s lawyers, she stated that,
“[d]espite the fact that the groups allegedly associated with Libya
Dawn are in physical control of Tripoli and therefore the judicial and
correctional facility system, there does not appear to have been any
significant disruption to the trial proceedings.”172
The ICC Prosecutor’s assertions were unduly optimistic and
ignored rule of law implications, considering the situation on the
ground as documented by NGOs. The UNSMIL and the Office of the
166. Rebecca Murray, Libya: A Tale of Two Governments, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 4,
2015,
10:03
AM),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/libya-talegovernments-150404075631141.html.
167. See Amnesty International, ICC Decision to Allow Abdallah Al-Senussi to
Stand Trial, supra note 86 (appealing to the United Nations Security Council for
help in protecting the oil installations and warning of the possibility of Libya
turning into a failed state).
168. Chris Stephen, Gaddafi’s Son Saif Al-Islam Sentenced to Death By Court in
Libya, GUARDIAN (July 28, 2015, 12:57 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2015/jul/28/saif-al-islam-sentenced-death-by-court-in-libya-gaddafi-son.
169. Id.
170. Id.; Chris Stephen, ICC Prosecutor Says Libya is Providing a Fair Trial for
Senussi
Despite
Chaos,
INT’L JUST. TRIB.
(Feb.
25,
2015),
https://www.justicetribune.com/articles/icc-prosecutor-says-libya-providing-fairtrial-senussi-despite-chaos.
171. Stephen, supra note 168.
172. Id.
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United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
documented ongoing and severe violent attacks against the judiciary
during the transition period, and specifically noted that the security
situation compromised the judiciary’s ability to function.173 Human
Rights Watch reported that “militias and criminals have harassed,
intimidated, threatened and in some cases assassinated judges,
prosecutors, witnesses, lawyers and judicial staff. The government
can provide little or no protection for them.”174 The Judicial Police,
the main body responsible for the protection of judges and
prosecutors and in charge of running detention facilities, “is weak,
lacks training and is ill-equipped.”175 Human rights groups working
in Libya documented numerous attacks on judges and lawyers,
including the assassination of judges in Tripoli.176
According to Human Rights Watch, in November 2015 - in one
region alone - 4,000 out of 6,000 prisoners were held in arbitrary
detention without formal charges.177 It also noted that, “[d]etainees,
family members, local organizations and the UN report widespread
ill-treatment of detainees in facilities across Libya, which has
resulted in deaths in custody.”178
In this context, concerns for the safety of the Tripoli detainees,
including Al-Senussi, and about the undermining of the Libyan
judiciary were well founded. In September 2015, a car bomb,
targeting Al-Senussi and Gaddafi, exploded near the Al-Hadba
prison in Tripoli.179 In July 2016, twelve members of the former
regime being detained in Al-Ruwaimi prison were murdered the day
173. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, supra note 158, at 20; Qadhafi
Regime Report, supra note 6, at 9.
174. Hanan Salah, Libya’s Justice Pandemonium, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 14,
2014, 10:17 AM), https://www.hrw.org/print/253389.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, supra note 158, at 20; see Salah,
supra note 174 (reporting on a pattern of mass, arbitrary detention and illtreatement
of
those
detained);
see
generally
Human Rights Watch, The Endless Wait: Long-Term Arbitrary Detentions and
Torture in Western Libya, (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/12/02/
endless-wait/long-term-arbitrary-detentions-and-torture-western-libya.
178. Salah, supra note 174.
179. Bomb Hits Near Libya Prison Holding Former Gaddafi Officials, ARAB
WKLY. (Sept. 9, 2015, 3:26 PM), http://www.thearabweekly.com/?id=1896.
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after they were due for release.180 After the killings, fears for the
safety of remaining Tripoli detainees led British lawyers for AlSenussi, Ben Emmerson and Rodney Dixon, to petition the ICC to
review its decision: “We are deeply concerned by reports of the
killing of detainees in Tripoli . . . [i]t is essential that the ICC chief
prosecutor call for a full review.”181
2. Challenges to Independence of the Judiciary
Despite efforts to secure credible background information on
judges in the Al-Senussi case, identified as Naji al-Amin, al-Sadeeq
Badi, and Badoura, such information was not publicly available.182 A
source reported that there was a close relationship between judges
and prosecutors, and the majority of judges were themselves former
prosecutors.183 Additionally, the IBA received credible information
that the Prosecutor and judges used a common entrance to the court,
and the Prosecutor also used this entrance when the judges were
deliberating.184 Even though this is not unique to Libya, it remains
cause for concern.185 In its 2013 Rule of Law Assessment Report, the
International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC) observed that
there was a lack of public trust in the judiciary in Libya.186 When the
assessment team, including the author, spoke to judges in Western
Libya, they found that the “courts had not yet begun to process [a]
significant number of cases against conflict-related detainees.”187
Furthermore, they found that, while the security situation facing the
judiciary in the East involved a broad pattern of attacks, threats to the
judiciary in the Western part of Libya appeared to result from courts
180. 12 Former Inmates Killed in Tripoli One Day After Release, LIBYA
OBSERVER (June 12, 2016, 1:51 PM), https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/12former-inmates-killed-tripoli-one-day-after-release.
181. Id.; see also Stephen, supra note 168.
182. See TRIAL OF THE LIBYAN REGIME, supra note 80, at 24-25 (noting that the
public had to rely on information from trial observers regarding the judges).
183. See Interview by Mark S. Ellis, Executive Director of the International Bar
Association, (Nov. 2015).
184. TRIAL OF THE LIBYAN REGIME, supra note 80, at 25.
185. Id.
186. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE CONSORTIUM, ILAC RULE OF LAW
ASSESSMENT REPORT: LIBYA 2013 36 (2013).
187. Id.
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exercising their independence to acquit suspects popularly believed
to have committed crimes against civilians.”188
3. Allegations of Ill-Treatment in Detention Facilities
As the 2013 ILAC Rule of Law Assessment Report stated, “[t]he
on-going detention with charge or trial of roughly 8,000 persons
alleged to have committed severe crimes on behalf of the Gaddafi
regime is undoubtedly the most serious human rights and rule of law
challenge facing the new Libya.”189 Around 3,000 detainees were in
legal detention centers run by local brigades.190 Furthermore, the
authorities frequently “had incomplete control over even official
prisons, leaving many of those detained at risk of abuse and
torture.”191
Allegations of torture in detention facilities were widespread in
Libya at the time of the trials.192 In March 2015, based on these
allegations, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment held
that, in the absence of information to the contrary, Libya had violated
Saif al-Islam Gaddafi’s rights against torture and ill treatment.193
When the Special Rapporteur outlined the allegations, Libya failed to
reply.194
UNSMIL received allegations that some defendants were beaten
188. Id.
189. Id. at 34.
190. See id. (finding that state authorities hold 5,000 out of roughly 8,000
detainees, leaving the rest in extra-legal detention centers).
191. Id.
192. See Libya: Flawed Trial of Gaddafi Officials, supra note 76 (explaining
that one unidentified person was beated and injured inside of his cell, but, despite
meeting with a defense lawyer, he did not know whether an investigation was
conducted).
193. Id.
194. Id.; see Juan E. Méndez (Special Rapporteur on Torture), Report of the
Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Juan E Méndez, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/68/Add.1, ¶ 298-99 (Mar. 5,
2015) (expressing regret that Libya did not reply to the communications and
concluding that there is substance to the ellegations of torture and ill-treatment);
TRIAL OF THE LIBYAN REGIME, supra note 80, at 49-50 (expressing concern over
possibility of ill-treatment rising to the level of torture while in detention for this
case).
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or otherwise mistreated, especially upon arrest and during their initial
period in detention.195 Some defense lawyers raised claims before the
Court of Assize asserting that their clients had been tortured, beaten,
threatened, and blackmailed, as well as forced to confess while in the
custody of armed groups, and threatened if they changed their
statements in front of the prosecutor.196 Still, the court dismissed the
defense’s claims and took no action to investigate.197
During the hearing on April 13, 2015, Al-Senussi’s lawyer
claimed that his client was beaten and interrogated by individuals not
belonging to the judicial authority.198 The court did not address this
claim in its verdict.199 Al-Senussi complained several times to the
court about being held in solitary confinement for prolonged periods,
and being subject to discriminatory treatment.200 In fact, a guard at
the Al-Hadba compound acknowledged to UNSMIL that families of
victims of the 1996 Abu Salim massacre and former detainees at the
prison targeted Al-Senussi with abuse.201
Similarly, the IBA reported that trial observers claimed on at least
one occasion that Al-Senussi complained to judges about his
detention conditions.202 According to the IBA, trial observation notes
document Al-Senussi telling the court that he had requested to be
transferred to a different facility.203Al-Senussi also informed the
court that he was under great pressure, and that he suffered from a
mental disorder.204 He complained to the court that the prison
authorities had not given him a new set of clothes, forcing him to
195. See Qadhafi Regime Report, supra note 6, at 28 (noting that most
defendants did not discuss their treatment during interviews, however four
defendants indicated that they were beaten).
196. Id.
197. See id. (finding the court based its verdict on a lack of evidence to support
the claim).
198. Id. at 29.
199. See id. (stating that during the investigation with the public prosecution on
September 17, 2012, Al-Senussi affirmed that he was beaten on his eye, head, and
legs and that he was interrogated by a non-judicial committee).
200. Id.
201. Qadhafi Regime Report, supra note 6, at 28.
202. See TRIAL OF THE LIBYAN REGIME, supra note 80, at 50.
203. Id.
204. Id. (noting that it was unclear what type of mental disorder he was suffering
from).
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wear the same clothes every day.205
The Human Rights Committee noted that prolonged solitary
confinement may amount to acts prohibited by Article 7 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).206 The
Special Rapporteur on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and
Degrading Treatment or Punishment recognized that the prolonged
isolation of a detainee may constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment, and in some cases, may amount to torture
because of its harmful physical and mental effects.207 The harmful
effects of prolonged solitary confinement have also been highlighted
by the Committee against Torture (CAT), which recommended the
abolition of such measures, particularly during pre-trial detention.208
Yet, according to Human Rights Watch, “during a trial session . . .
Senussi’s lawyers said that he was being held in solitary
confinement.”209 At another session, Al-Senussi protested that “he
had been held in solitary confinement for two and a half years.”210
205. Id.
206. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20: Article 7
(Prohibition of Torture, or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment), ¶ 6 (March 10, 1992) (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”); see also International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec.16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
207. Special Rapporteur on Torture, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur of
the Human Rights Council on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, ¶¶ 21-22, U.N. Doc. A/66/268 (Aug. 5, 2011),
https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/445/70/pdf/N1144570.pdf?OpenElement;
Special Rapporteur on Torture, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 83,
U.N. Doc. A/63/175, ¶¶ 77, 83 (July 28, 2008), https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/440/75/pdf/N0844075.pdf?OpenElement.
208. See, e.g., Rep. of Committee against Torture, ¶¶ 186, 188, 220, 226, U.N.
Doc.
A/52/44
(1997),
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/N97/235/57/img/N9723557.pdf?OpenElement (affirming that solitary
confinement “may only be used as an exceptional disciplinary sanction of last
resort and for a restricted period,” and added that “[b]oth its use and the manner in
which it is implemented must be subject to stringent control”); Rep. of Committee
against Torture, ¶ 61, U.N. Doc. A/69/44 (2014), https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/125/96/pdf/G1412596.pdf?OpenElement.
209. Libya: Flawed Trial of Gaddafi Officials, supra note 76.
210. Id.
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In their Report of February 21, 2017, UNSMIL and OHCHR
expressed concern that solitary confinement appears to have been
used widely at the Al-Hadba prison, where several detainees were
allegedly kept in isolation for periods of up to eight months.211
Concerns were also raised by UNSMIL and OHCHR with regard to
allegations of torture at the Al-Hadba compound, especially in view
of the pattern of torture and other human rights abuses committed by
armed groups since 2011 in a climate of total impunity for the
perpetrators.212

V. COMPLEMENTARITY DOCTRINE AND DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS: AN ILL-DEFINED
RELATIONSHIPIN THE AL-SENUSSI
ADMISSIBILITY DECISION
The principle of complementarity, enshrined in Article 17 of the
Rome Statute, governs the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction.213 The
Rome Statute recognizes that states have primary responsibility for
investigations and prosecutions of international crimes committed in
their jurisdictions.214 This means that the ICC may only exercise
jurisdiction where states purport to act, but in reality are unwilling or
unable to genuinely carry out proceedings.215 The principle of
complementarity is based on respect for the sovereignty of states, as
well as on considerations of efficiency and effectiveness, as it is
believed that states will generally have the best access to evidence
and witnesses, as well as the resources to carry out proceedings.216
Moreover, there are limitations on the number of prosecutions the
211. Qadhafi Regime Report, supra note 6, at 29 (stating that this left detainees
vulnerable to intimidation and that many detainees were held in solitary
confinement on more than one occasion).
212. See id. at 30 (noting that many defendants remained under the control of
armed groups, which heightened the concerns regarding allegations of tortured
defendants).
213. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 15, art. 17.
214. See id. at pmbl. (“Recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for interntional crimes.”); see also
INTENATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT-OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 26, ¶ 1.
215. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT-OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra
note 26, ¶ 1.
216. Id.
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ICC can practically conduct.217

A. COMPLEMENTARITY AND UNWILLINGNESS
In principle, under the ICC doctrine of complementarity, when a
case is subject to national investigations or prosecution, that case is
deemed inadmissible before the ICC unless “the State is unwilling or
unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution”
(emphasis added).218 For the purpose of determining unwillingness,
Article 17(2) lists three factors that must be considered in the court’s
assessment, with regard to the due process principles recognized by
international law.
First, where the proceedings were or are being undertaken, or the
national decision not to prosecute was made in order to shield a
person from criminal responsibility, the court can find that the State
in question is unwilling to investigate or prosecute for purposes of
Article 17 of the Rome Statute.219 Secondly, where there has been an
unjustified delay in proceedings, which in the circumstances is
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice,220
the court can interpret such actions as “unwillingness.” Finally,
where proceedings were or are not being conducted independently or
impartially, and were or are being conducted in a manner
inconsistent, in the circumstances, with an intent to bring the person
concerned to justice,221 such action can be interpreted as an
“unwillingness” to prosecute in admissibility proceedings.
This article will focus on the third factor enumerated in Article
17(2)(c), relating to impartiality and independence. This factor has
been the subject of controversy among legal academics and
experts.222

217. Id.
218. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 15, art.
17(1)(a).
219. Id. art. 17(2)(a).
220. Id. art. 17(2)(b).
221. Id. art. 17(2)(c).
222. See, e.g., ELLIS, SOVEREIGNTY AND JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 126-30
(considering the legal debate over standards of impartiality and independence for
domestic proceedings).
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1. Unwillingness and the “Due Process Thesis”
A brief look at the history of the complementarity principle
highlights the challenges associated with Article 17 of the Statute,
particularly in its attempt to draw the right balance between
upholding the fight against impunity and preserving state
sovereignty.223 Article 17(2)(c) of the Statute states that the
proceedings will be admissible where “they were not, or are not
being conducted independently or impartially, and they were or are
being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice”
(emphasis added).224
It is possible to examine independence and impartiality through
the lens of national prosecutions. In relation to interpreting the term
“justice,” the ICC clearly favors the view that “justice” means
punishment for wrongdoing.225 However, an analysis of the
preparatory work (drafting history) demonstrates that the terms
“independence,” “impartiality” and “justice” in the context of Article
17(2)(c) should be interpreted more expansively.226
There is a vast amount of expert academic opinion, as well as
relevant international jurisprudence, which supports aggressive
adherence to the “due process” approach.227 However, even though
223. See id. at 20-25 (discussing the advent of the complemntarity framework to
help balance state sovereignty and fighting impunity).
224. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 15, art.
17(2)(c).
225. See WILLIAM SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE 456-57 (2d ed. 2016).
226. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), Jan. 27, 1969, 1115
U.N.T.S. 340, [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (revealing that the text of Article
17 fails to offer a clear interpretation in accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and
meaning, accordingly, recourse may be held to supplementary means of
interpretation, such as the preparatory work of the treaty).
227. See Schabas, supra note 225, at 468 (arguing also that the case law of
human rights treaty bodies may be helpful in addressing issues related to Article
17(2)(c)); see e.g., Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Decision
Granting Provisional Release to Enver Hadžihasanović, ¶ 5 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 19, 2011) (showing that the Tribunal interpreted the
term “justice” to mean respect for the rights of the accused and the rights of
victims); Dawn Yamane Hewett, Sudan’s Courts and Complementarity in the Face
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the court has accepted that due process violations are relevant when
assessing “unwillingness,”228 its determination in the Al-Senussi case
demonstrates that it has adopted an overly restrictive approach to
assessing the relevance of due process violations within the context
of Article 17(2)(c). Despite the fact that it is within the court’s
powers to determine the degree of relevance of due process
violations, its discretion is not unfettered.229 The court should
exercise such discretion in line with statutory requirements,230 the
intentions of the original drafters of the Rome Statute,231 and the
practice of other tribunals and relevant expert and academic
opinions.
B. WORK OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE AND THE “SHIELDING”
VARIANT OF UNWILLINGNESS
The drafting history of the Rome Statute offers an important
means of establishing special meanings, confirming interpretations,
and providing clarification of obscure terms.232 Upon careful review
of Darfur, 31 YALE J. INT’L LAW 276, 278 (2006); Federica Gioia, State
Sovereignty, Jurisdiction and ‘Modern’ International Law: The Principle of
Complementarity in the International Criminal Court, 19 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1095,
1111-12 (2006) (arguing that the phrase “bring the accused to justice” requires
assessing both the guilt and punishment stage, as well as the impartial process of
bringing the accused to justice).
228. See Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Judgment on Al-Senussi Appeal, supra note 18,
¶ 220.
229. See John T. Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE ISSUES,
NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 41, 48-51 (Lee ed., 1999) (considering the complexity of
procedural fairness as a a part of the impartial proceeding standard).
230. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 15, art. 21(3)
(“The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be
consistent with internationally recognized human rights.”).
231. Vienna Convention, supra note 226, art. 31(1), 1115 U.N.T.S. (“A treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.”); see, e.g., Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC01/09-19, ¶ 92 (Mar. 31, 2010) (showing where the Court found that, “had the
drafters intended to exclude non-State actors from the term ‘organization,’ they
would not have included this term in article 7(2)(a) of the Statute”).
232. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT-OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra
note 26, ¶ 26 (noting that reconstructing the history is challenging given the
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of its history, one can argue that the majority of original drafters
never intended the court to render cases admissible on the sole basis
of due process violations.233 Discussions within the Preparatory
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court
further demonstrate that most delegations opposed a proposal by
France to grant the Court a more expansive role in exercising
jurisdiction where there is “denial of justice.”234 An Italian
proposal,235 which suggested that the court be tasked with the duty of
assessing whether the fundamental rights of the accused are
respected or not, did not make it into the final version of Article 35
(subsequently Article 17).236
The first debate on the question of complementarity opened during
the Preparatory Committee’s session held in March and April
1996.237 However, it was not until the Preparatory Committee’s
meeting in August 1997 that the concept of “unwillingness” was
discussed in more detail.238 Initially, there was general consensus that
complexity of the statute).
233. See Report of the Ad Hoc Comm. on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/50/22, ¶¶ 41, 43, 45, 162, 177, 180 (Sept. 6, 1995),
https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/269/67/pdf/N9526967.pdf?OpenElement
(noting agreement that the words “available” and “ineffective” were unclear).
234. See U.N. Secretary-General, Comments Received Pursuant to Paragraph 4
of General Assembly Resolution 49/53 on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. A/AC.244/1/Add.2 (Mar. 31, 1995), [hereinafter
Comments]
https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/093/87/pdf/N9509387.pdf?OpenElement.
235. See Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Ct.,
Recommendation by the Preparatory Committee to the General Assembly in
Connection with the Invitation by the Government of Italy to Host the Diplomatic
Conference, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1997/WG.3/IP.4 (Aug. 5, 1997).
236. See Holmes, supra note 229, at 50 (mentioning that the drafting history of
Article 17(2) of the Rome Statute shows that many delegations agreed that
procedural fairness should not be a ground for defining complementarity, thus
rejecting the proposal by Italy to make the absence of national due process a
ground for admissibility. John Holmes was the coordinator of consultations on
complementarity during both the Preparatory Committee and the Rome
Conference).
237. Id. at 45.
238. See id. at 45-47 (noting that other substantive issues included reference to
jurisdiction, and whether the Court could act if the State was unwilling and unable
to do so).
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the main purpose of the notion of unwillingness was to avoid sham
proceedings aimed at shielding perpetrators.239 Nevertheless, two
additional types of unwillingness emerged and subsequently made
their way into the final draft of the Statute.240 This demonstrates that
the concept of unwillingness was not to be assessed solely in the
context of efforts to shield the accused from justice. In fact, the latter
form of unwillingness, which refers to the lack of independence and
impartiality of the proceedings (including due process guarantees for
defendants), was considered necessary in order to capture procedural
issues that do not amount to the shielding variant of unwillingness.241
Although some have questioned the drafters’ decision to adopt three
different categories of unwillingness, given the significant overlap
between them,242 the drafters clearly intended that there would be
three separate categories of unwillingness.243
The drafter’s intent is inconsistent with the Appeals Chamber’s
argument that the concept should generally be understood as
referring to proceedings which will lead to a suspect evading justice
(i.e., sham proceedings).244 The Court’s reasoning in this respect
seems to suggest that unwillingness based on the absence of
impartiality and independence should be understood in the context of
sham proceedings. This would suggest that Article 17(2)(c) does not
differ much from Article 17(2)(a). However, it is difficult to argue
that this could have been the drafters’ intention because it would
amount to a duplication that serves no actual purpose.
Furthermore, to address concerns of some delegations that Article
239. See id. at 50 (showing that as a result this definition was easily included).
240. See Holmes, supra note 229, at 50-51 (noting the Statute’s need to provide
guidance relating to the nature of the delay, thus creating the phrase “undue delay”
to mean “[t]he delay must, in the circumstances, be “inconsistent with an intent to
bring the person concerned to justice.” The second type of unwillingness “was the
question of the independence and impartiality of the proceedings.”).
241. See id. at 50-51 (considering that a State may want to prosecute an
individual but is unwilling because of the potential for manipulation of the
domestic proceeding).
242. See JANN K. KLEFFNER, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE ROME STATUTE AND
NATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTIONS 1, 159 (Oxford University Press 2008).
243. See Holmes, supra note 229, at 50-51 (emphasizing the individual
importance of all three categories of unwillingness).
244. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Judgment on Al-Senussi Appeal, supra note 18, ¶ 2.
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17(2)245 of the Draft Statute gave the Court too much discretion to
determine “unwillingness,” it was agreed during negotiations in
Rome that wording would be inserted in the paragraph to deal with
independence and impartiality.246 The added wording stated: “having
regard to the principles of due process recognized by international
law.”247
Even though the relevant passage was later removed from the text
of what is today Article 17(2)(c), and placed in the chapeau of
Article 17(2),248 its original inclusion under the section dealing with
independence and impartiality was far from random. It demonstrates
that the drafters clearly envisioned that Article 17(2)(c) would be
interpreted in line with internationally recognized human rights
standards and due process guarantees. It further suggests that the
terms “independence” and “impartiality” were not to be interpreted
as independence and impartiality of the Court alone, because clearly,
due process guarantees contained in international human rights
instruments are much wider.249 Most importantly, it indicates that the
threshold for finding that due process violations amount to
unwillingness under Article 17(2)(c) should be set in accordance
with recognized international law principles.

VI. JUS COGENS STATUS OF FAIR TRIAL RIGHTS
If the international justice system is to rely on domestic courts to
bring to justice those who have perpetrated the most heinous crimes,
then these courts must equally ensure that those trials are nonpolitical and that they meet international fair trial standards.
Addressing the referral of cases to competent domestic
jurisdictions for trial, former President of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Judge Theodor Meron,
affirmed in his 2004 statement to the UN Security Council, that
245. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 15, art. 17(2).
246. See Holmes, supra note 229, at 48.
247. Id. at 53.
248. See id. at 54 (according to the coordinator John Holmes, the inclusion of
the notion of due process into the chapeau of the paragraph on unwillingness
would have had the effect of adding an element of objectivity to all the three
criteria listed in the sub-paragraphs of Article 17(2)).
249. See id. at 50-51.
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“[n]ational courts can only play this role . . . if trials are not used for
political purposes and if they meet international standards of due
process and fair trial.”250
The right to a fair trial has been codified in a number of human
rights instruments and today is recognized as not only customary
international law but also as a jus cogens norm, binding on all states
through their acknowledgment of its imperative force.251
The inclusion of the right to a fair trial into modern human rights
instruments can be traced back to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in
1948. Article 10 of the Declaration provides for the right to a fair
trial in both criminal and civil proceedings, stating that “[e]veryone
is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights
and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.” 252
Fair trial guarantees are also contained in several regional human
rights instruments. The 1948 American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man affirms, under Article 18, the right of every individual
to “resort to the courts to ensure respect for his legal rights.”253
250. Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
Address of Judge Theodor Meron, President of the ICTY, to the U.N. Security
Council, U.N. Press Release TM/P.I.S./916-e (Nov. 23, 2004),
www.icty.org/en/press/address-judge-theodor-meron-president-icty-un-securitycouncil.
251. See Vienna Convention, supra note 226, art. 53, 1115 U.N.T.S. at 53; see
also Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2003-09-PT, Decision on the
Application for a Stay of Proceedings and Denial of Right to Appeal, ¶ 19 (Nov. 4,
2003); see also Kamrul Hossain, The Concept of Jus Cogens and the Obligation
Under The U.N. Charter, 3 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 72, 73 (2005),
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1011&context=scuj
il (suggesting the concept of jus cogens to refer to those norms of general
international law that are deemed as hierarchically superior in comparison to other
ordinary norms of international law, and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character. Jus
cogens, in fact, consists of a set of rules which are peremptory in nature and from
which no derogation is permitted under any circumstances.).
252. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N.
Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948).
253. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man art. XVIII, 1948,
reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American
System, OAS/Ser.L/V/I.4 Rev. 9 (2003), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/
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Article 8 of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights
recognizes a general “right to a hearing, with due guarantees and
within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial
tribunal, previously established by law” in criminal proceedings as
well as in proceedings involving civil, labor, fiscal, and other
matters.254 The same article codifies, in its second paragraph, a range
of “minimum guarantees” specifically intended for those accused of
a criminal offence.255 Interestingly, the language used resembles that
of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
The ECHR, adopted in 1950, entitles “everyone” to a fair and
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law.256 Additionally, it adds a full
set of “minimum rights” explicitly intended for everyone charged
with a criminal offense. These basic guarantees include, inter alia,
the right of an accused to have time and facilities adequate for the
preparation of a defense, the right to defend himself in person or
through legal assistance of his own choosing, the right to obtain
witnesses to testify on his behalf and to challenge witnesses
testifying against him.257
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted in
1981, and the League of Arab States’ Charter on Human Rights, as
amended in 2004, codify the right to a fair trial.258 Whereas Article 7
of the African Charter contains some of the rights encompassed in
other human rights instruments, including the right to be defended by
a counsel of choice and to be tried in a reasonable time by an
impartial court or tribunal, it does not explicitly refer to other

mandate/Basics/declaration.asp.
254. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights
art. 8, ¶ 1, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 114 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter
American Convention on Human Rights].
255. Id. art. 8(2)-(5).
256. See European Convention on Human Rights art. 6(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
257. See id. art. 6(3).
258. See African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 7,
U.N.T.S. 26363 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter Banjul Charter]; see
also Arab Charter on Human Rights art. 13, Mar. 22, 1945 [hereinafter Arab
Charter].
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constitutive elements of the right to a fair trial.259 Nevertheless, the
provision must be interpreted in a broad manner to include various
other fair trial guarantees as illustrated in several human rights
instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.260
Conversely, the Arab Charter provides a full list of fair trial
rights.261 Along the lines of Article 6 of the ECHR, the Arab Charter
affords a range of “minimum guarantees” to the accused charged
with a criminal offence, including the rights, among others, to
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defense, to
defend himself in person or through a counsel of his own choosing,
to examine the prosecution witnesses, and to summon witnesses on
his behalf.262
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by the UN General Assembly in 1966, provides under Article 14 a
comprehensive array of “minimum” due process and fair trial rights
afforded to everyone accused of a criminal offence.263 With a total of
169 States Parties (including Libya), the ICCPR is undoubtedly the
principal global treaty addressing political and civil rights, to the
point that some of its obligations today reflect customary
international law.264 Included in this set of obligations reflecting
customary international law is Article 14 of the ICCPR, which, in the
opinion of many scholars and international lawyers, has even

259. See Banjul Charter, supra note 258, art. 7; see also Patrick Robinson, The
Right to a Fair Trial in International Law, with Specific Reference to the Work of
the ICTY, 3 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. PUBLICIST 1, 4-5 (Oct. 2009),
http://bjil.typepad.com/Robinson_macro.pdf (suggesting “that the provisions are to
be interpreted broadly to include various components as spelled out in a number of
international instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”).
260. See Robinson, supra note 259, at 5.
261. See Arab Charter, supra note 258, art. 13.
262. Id. art. 16.
263. ICCPR, supra note 206, art. 14.
264. See Montani Davide, The Right to Secede: A Comparative Analysis 1, 23
(2014-2015) (unpublished thesis, Libera Università Internazionale Degli Sudi
Sociali) http://tesi.eprints.luiss.it/15931/1/montani-davide-tesi-2015.pdf. (noting
that customary international law consists of two elements: an objective
element,”diuturnitas,” the constant repetition of certain behaviors by the majority
of the States; and a subject element, “opinion iuris sive necessitates,” the belief by
those States that such behaviors are legally binding).
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achieved the status of a “jus cogens norm.”265
In addition, there is a group of ICCPR principles, articulated in
Article 4(2), from which no derogation is permitted.266 The UN
Human Rights Committee has stressed the non-exhaustion of the list
of non-derogable provisions provided in Article 4(2), and affirmed
that even in a state of emergency, states cannot depart from
fundamental fair trial principles:
The proclamation of certain provisions of the Covenant as being of a nonderogable nature, in article 4, paragraph 2, is to be seen partly as
recognition of the peremptory nature of some fundamental rights ensured
in treaty form in the Covenant (e.g., arts. 6 and 7).
Furthermore, the category of peremptory norms extends beyond the list of
non-derogable provisions as given in article 4, paragraph 2. States parties
may in no circumstances invoke article 4 of the Covenant as justification
for acting in violation of humanitarian law or peremptory norms of
international law, for instance . . . by deviating from fundamental
principles of fair trial, including the presumption of innocence.267

Moreover, although Article 14 of the ICCPR is not included in the
265. See THE LAW REPORTS OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, VOL. II,
PROSECUTOR V. NORMAN, FOFANA AND KONDEWA (THE CDF CASE) (Charles C.
Jalloh & Simon M. Meisenberg eds., 2013); see also CYRIL LAUCCI, DIGEST OF
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE SPECIAL COURT OF SIERRA LEONE 2003-2005 156-57
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2007) (arguing “that the right to a fair hearing would
– at least in the context of criminal proceedings – by now constitute an element of
jus cogens); U.N. SEC. COUNCIL, REVIEW OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY MEMBER
STATES 22 (Erika de Wet & André Nollkaemper eds., 2003) (noting that “there are
reservations, by countries as important as Italy, Germany, Belgium and Norway to
the extension of this Rule to convictions rendered by higher courts”).
266. Summary Records of the Commission on Human Rights, Fifth Session, R.
195, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 195, ¶¶ 38, 57 (May 29, 1950); see ICCPR, supra note
206, arts. 6-8, 11, 15-16, 18 (providing the right to life; protection against torture
or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; prohibition of slavery;
prohibition of imprisonment merely because of failure to fulfill a contractual
obligation, and freedom of movement and residence; prohibition of retrospective
punishment without a law; the right of recognition as a person before the law; and
freedom of thought, conscience and religion).
267. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, CCPR General
Comment No. 29, Article 4: Derogations during a State of Emergency, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, ¶ 11 (adopted Aug. 31, 2001) [hereinafter CCPR
General Comment].
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list of non-derogable rights of Article 4(2),268 states derogating from
normal procedures required under Article 14, in circumstances of a
public emergency, must ensure such derogations do not exceed those
strictly required by the exigencies of the actual situation.269 Most
importantly, the UN Human Rights Committee has confirmed yet
again that “[t]he requirement of competence, independence and
impartiality of a tribunal in the sense of Article 14, Paragraph 1, is an
absolute right that is not subject to any exception.”270
It is accepted that states enjoy a certain margin of appreciation
with regard to judicial procedures during a situation of emergency.271
However, there is no legally sound reasoning that allows states, in
times of emergency, to depart from minimum judicial safeguards,
namely the minimum fair trial standards that apply even in the most
difficult circumstances.272
The customary nature of the minimum fair trial standards can also
be inferred from the inclusion of an extensive list of fair trial
principles in the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva
Conventions.273 For example, Article 75(4) of Additional Protocol I
(which applies to “international armed conflict”274) provides the right
268. ICCPR, supra note 206, art 4.
269. CCPR General Comment No. 29, supra note 267, ¶ 6.
270. Human Rights Committee, supra note 79, ¶ 19.
271. See Richard Smith, The Margin of Appreciation and Human Rights
Protection in the ‘War on Terror’: Have the Rules Changed before the European
Court of Human Rights?, 8 ESSEX HUM. RTS. REV. 124, 4 (2011) (considering that
domestic authorities are in a better place to assess whether an emergency exists).
272. Evelyne Schmid, The Right to a Fair Trial in Times of Terrorism: A
Method to Identify the Non-Derogable Aspects of Article 14 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1 GÖTTINGEN J. INT’L L. 29, 36 (2009)
(“derogations can only be made in officially proclaimed emergencies which
threaten the life of the nation; the measures must be strictly required by the
exingencies of the situation; they must be non-discriminatory and must not be
inconsistent with the State’s other obligations under international law”).
273. Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)
art. 75, U.N.T.S. 17512 (entered into force Mar. 1, 1994); Protocols Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 6, U.N.T.S. 17513
(entered into force Mar. 1, 1994).
274. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, HOW IS THE TERM
“ARMED CONFLICT” DEFINED IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-2 (2008) (asserting that
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to have a sentence passed or a penalty executed only pursuant to a
conviction pronounced by an impartial and regularly constituted
court which respects the generally recognized principles of regular
judicial procedure, including, inter alia, the presumption of
innocence, the right of the accused to be tried in his presence, the
right to examine or have examined the witnesses against him and to
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf
under the same conditions as witnesses against him.275
In addition, the entire Part II (“Human Treatment”) of Additional
Protocol II is aimed at guaranteeing respect for the basic rights of the
individuals in “non-international armed conflicts.”276 Judicial
guarantees play a particularly significant role, since every person is
entitled to a fair and regular trial, independent of the
circumstances.277
Article 6 of Additional Protocol II also affirms “some principles of
universal application,” including, “affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples.”278 Article 6(2), sub-paragraphs a)–f) enumerate an
illustrative list of universally recognized due process standards from
which no derogation may be accepted. They include “in particular”
the right to defense, the principle of individual criminal
responsibility, the principle of non-retroactivity, the presumption of
innocence, the right of the accused to be tried in his presence, and the
right not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess
International Armed Conflicts (IAC) are conflicts between two or more High
Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions, i.e., states, that have led to the
intervention of armed forces. They fall under the Geneva Conventions through
Common Article 2.).
275. Additional Protocol (I) to the Geneva Convention, supra note 273, art.
75(4).
276. Additional Protocol (II) to the Geneva Convention, supra note 273, pmbl.
(explaining that Non-International Armed Conflicts (NIAC) are all other types of
conflicts which differ from International Armed Conflicts. They are defined in
Common Article 3 as, “armed conflict not of an international character occurring
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.”).
277. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12
AUGUST 1949 1396-97 (Sandoz et al. eds., 1987), www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_
Law/pdf/Commentary_GC_Protocols.pdf.
278. Id.
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guilt.279
Article 6 confirms the principle that anyone accused of having
committed an offence related to the conflict, whether civilian or
combatant, is still entitled to a fair trial.280 This right is effective only
if the court issuing the judgment is capable of offering essential
guarantees of independence and impartiality.281

VII. CONCEPT OF “EGREGIOUS VIOLATION” IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Appeals Chamber’s reliance on the concept of “egregious
violations” of due process requires a determination of exactly what
kind of violations would rise to this level. There is some guidance in
international law principles and the practice of international tribunals
for this assessment.282
The terms “flagrant denial of due process rights,” “serious
violation” and other qualifiers have been used in international law to
refer to violations of human rights and due process rights that are
particularly heinous and severe.283 Over time, egregious and
systematic violations of human rights have come to be associated and
identified with violations of rights the international community
considers fundamental.284 UN human rights bodies have developed
the concept of “gross violations,” to enable them to identify and
respond to the “most serious” violations, which consist of a
“systematic policy of violations” that reach “a high degree of

279. Additional Protocol (II) to the Geneva Convention, supra note 273, art.
6(2).
280. Id.
281. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 277, at 1398.
282. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 15, art.
21(1)(b) (stating that the Court should have regard, “where appropriate, [to]
applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the
established principles of the international law of armed conflict.”).
283. See, e.g., Joint Committee on Human Rights, Human Rights Implications
of UK Extradition Policy – Written Evidence 73 (published June 21, 2011),
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/humanrights/JCHR_EXT_Written_Evidence_11.pdf.
284. Takhmina Karimova, What amounts to ‘a serious violation of international
human rights law’, GENEVA ACAD. BRIEFING No. 6, Aug. 2014, at 9.
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seriousness” over a period of time.285
In the context of criminal trials, international law provides a
definition of a “flagrant denial of due process rights” through the
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The
ECtHR has indicated that certain forms of unfairness in criminal
trials could amount to a “flagrant denial of justice.”286 These include
conviction in absentia with no possibility to obtain a fresh
determination of the merits,287 a trial that is summary in nature and
conducted with a total disregard for the rights of the defence,288
detention without access to an independent and impartial tribunal to
have the legality of the detention reviewed,289 deliberate and
systematic refusal of access to a lawyer, especially for an individual
detained in a foreign country,290 and where a conviction is based on
evidence obtained by torture of third persons.291
Furthermore, in Othman (Abu Qatada) v. The United Kingdom,
the Court stated that “flagrant denial of justice” is a stringent test of
unfairness.292 According to the Court, a flagrant denial of justice goes
beyond mere irregularities or lack of safeguards in the trial
procedures such as might result in a breach of Article 6 of the
ECHR.293 What is required is a breach of the principles of fair trial
285. See id. at 10.
286. See Ahorugeze v. Sweden, App. No. 27075/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 19 (2011).
287. See Sejdovic v. Italy, App. No. 56581/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 84 (2006) (“The
duty to guarantee the right of a criminal defendant to be present in the
courtroom . . . ranks as one of the essential requirements of Article 6.”); see also
Stoichkov v. Bulgaria, App. No. 9808/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 11, ¶ 56 (2005); Einhorn
v. France, App. No. 71555/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 31 (2001).
288. See Bader & Kanbor v. Sweden, App. No. 13284/04, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R.
¶ 47 (2006) (find the procceding as a “flagrant denial of justice”).
289. See Al-Moayad v. Germany, No. 35865/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 101 (2007).
290. Id.
291. See Othman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8139/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 263
(2012).
292. See generally id. (finding that a Jordanian national who was recognized as
a refugee in the United Kingdom was to be deported in the interests of Jordan’s
national security. The United Kingdom gained assurances from Jordan that he
would not be subjected to ill-treatment and would receive a fair trial, but the
applicant argued that Jordan would not abide by the agreed-upon terms if he was
deported back to his home country. The claims were ultimately dismissed.).
293. See id. (elucidating “that the central issue in the present case is the real risk
that evidence obtained by torture of third persons will be admitted at the
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guaranteed by Article 6, which is so fundamental as to amount to
“nullification, or destruction of the very essence, of the right
guaranteed by that Article.”294

A. VIOLATIONS OF DUE PROCESS RIGHTS DO NOT NEED TO BE
“EGREGIOUS” TO RENDER A TRIAL UNFAIR
Violations that do not meet the high threshold can still have
irremediable consequences for an accused, especially where a
number of different rights are violated in the course of the
proceedings, even where each violation, on its own, would not be
sufficient to render a trial unfair.
For example, the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR), under Rule 11bis of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, consider a number of factors when deciding whether trials
in domestic courts are sufficiently fair to allow referral to state
authorities.295 According to Rule 11bis of the ICTY Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, the Court may not transfer cases to national
courts where the accused would not be accorded fair trial rights.296
The Referral Bench in Prosecutor v. Stanković laid out a complete
list of requirements for a fair criminal trial, which draws heavily on
the fair trial guarantees found in the ICCPR.297 In the Tadić case, the
Appeals Chamber affirmed that “Article 14 of the International
Covenant reflects an imperative norm of international law to which
applicant’s retrial”).
294. Id. ¶ 260.
295. See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY],
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 46, 8-9 (Oct. 20, 2011);
see also International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR], Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, 9 (1995).
296. See Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, supra note 250, at 2-3.
297. See Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral
of Case Under Rule 11 BIS, ¶ 55 (2005) (finding that the text of Article 14 of the
ICCPR does not make any reference to “flagrant” or “egregious” violations, nor
does it distinguish between “egregious” and “ordinary” breaches of fair trial
guarantees. The prosecutor in this case found the accused guilty of arresting,
interrogating and raping a group of Bosnian Muslim women and detaining them to
continue sexually abusing the group of women. He was also found guilty of raping
four young women and girls.).
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the Tribunal must adhere.”298 The Appeals Chamber in the Aleksovski
proceedings, commenting on the right of appeal as a component of
the fair trial requirement set out in Articles 14 of the ICCPR and
21(4) of the ICTY Statute, argued that “the right to a fair trial is, of
course, a requirement of customary international law.”299 In
Furundžija, the Appeals Chamber stated that the fundamental human
right of an accused to be tried before an independent and impartial
tribunal is generally recognised as being an integral component of
the right of an accused to a fair trial.300
In the Norman, Kallon, and Gbao cases, the Special Court of
Sierra Leone (SCSL) ruled on the so-called “fast-track” process for
deciding preliminary motions relating to jurisdiction, holding that
pursuant to Rule 72 of the SCSL Rules of Procedure and Evidence
the Trial Chamber shall refer these applications to the Appeals
Chamber for expeditious determination, instead of deciding them in
the first instance.301 The Appeals Chamber acknowledged that the
right to an expeditious trial is now firmly entrenched in international
law, through the provisions of Article 14(3)(c) of the ICCPR and the
decisions of the ECHR.302 In the Court’s reasoning, the right to an
expeditious trial must not be interpreted as just a right of a defendant,
but more generally as a vital guarantee for victims of international
298. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No IT-94-1-A-AR77, Appeal Judgement on
Allegations of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, 1, 3 (Feb. 27, 2001)
(finding Tadić guilty for committing war crimes at a Serb-run concentration camp.
Tadić challenged the court on the ground that it exceeded the U.N. Security
Council’s authority but his claim was ultimately dismissed by the Trial Court).
299. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 104
(Mar. 24, 2000).
300. Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 177
(July 21, 2000) (determining that Anto Furundžija, the commander of a special unit
of the Croatian Defense Council known as the “Jokers,” was guilty as a coperpetrator of the war crime of torture and for aiding and abetting the war crime of
rape, and sentenced to ten years imprisonment).
301. Prosecutor v. Norman, Kallon, and Gbao, Case No. SCSL-2003-08-PT,
SCSL-2003-07-PT, SCSL-2003-09-PT, Decision on the Applications for a Stay of
Proceedings and Proceedings and Denial of Right to Appeal, ¶ 13(F) (Nov. 4,
2003) (assessing the concerns raised by multiple defendants regarding the
lawfulness of the Special Court for Sierra Leone among other issues, in which the
Appeals Chamber decided that Rule 72 was necessary to further the right of
justice, not to stay the applications, and to move forward with proceedings).
302. Id. ¶ 7.
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crimes.303
In refusing the arguments that the accused has the right to a twotier determination of the pre-trial preliminary motions, the Appeals
Chamber found that no contravention of the right provided in Article
14(5) of the ICCPR to have a conviction or sentence reviewed by a
higher tribunal could be deduced from the “fast-track” process of
referral of preliminary motions.304 In doing so, the Court recognized
the jus cogens nature of Article 14(5) and stated that “the very
agreement by the UN to the terms of Article 20 of the Special Court
Statute affords some evidence that it [Article 14(5)] has indeed
reached the status termed by international lawyers ‘jus cogens.’”305
In Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, the Trial Chamber denied a referral
where there were concerns about witness testimony and equality of
arms.306 The Appeals Chamber in Kanyarukiga did not base its
decision on an analysis of whether the violations were particularly
“egregious” or severe, but rather agreed with the Trial Chamber that
the combination of factors and violations “show[ed] that the working
conditions for the Defence might be difficult, which might have a
bearing on the fairness of the trial.”307
Apart from the limited reference to “flagrant” violations of due
process rights in the Abu Qatada case, other regional and
international human rights tribunals do not usually distinguish
between “egregious” and “ordinary” violations of due process rights.
For example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR)
has held that there can be no “due process of law” if a defendant is
unable to assert his rights “effectively.”308 In the case of Hilaire,
Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, it was
303. Id. ¶ 8.
304. Id. ¶ 18.
305. Id. ¶¶ 18-19.
306. Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-2002-78-R11bis, Decision on
the Prosecution’s Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11bis, ¶ 19
(Oct. 30, 2008) (convicting Gaspard Kanyarukiga of genocide and extermination
for the events that took place during April 1994 in Nyange that resulted in the
death of thousands of Tutsi).
307. Id. ¶¶ 18-19.
308. See Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 94, ¶ 146 (June 21, 2002).
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noted that in order to ensure a veritable guarantee of the right to a
fair trial, the proceedings must adhere to all the requirements that
“are designed to protect, to ensure or to assert the entitlement to a
right or the exercise thereof,” or rather, “the prerequisites necessary
to ensure the adequate protection of those persons whose rights or
obligations are pending judicial determination.”309
The jurisprudence of the IACtHR advocates for a holistic
approach to determining whether there have been violations of due
process rights that would render the proceedings unfair.310 The
approach is based on a defendant’s ability to assert his or her rights
“effectively.”311 In the absence of such “effectiveness,” there is
simply no due process of law.
The Human Rights Committee applies a lower threshold test than
that set by the Appeals Chamber in the Al-Senussi case, especially in
situations where the accused is facing the risk of a death sentence.312
The Committee’s findings on issues relating to fair trial guarantees
(especially in capital cases) demonstrate that where human life is at
stake, the application of the highest standards is non-negotiable.
For example, in Chan v. Guyana, the Committee found that a twoday adjournment constituted an inadequate amount of time for a

309. Id. ¶ 147; see also The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the
Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC16/99, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 16, ¶ 118 (Oct. 1, 1999) [hereinafter The
Right to Information on Consular Assistance]; Judicial Guarantees in States of
Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 and 8 American Convention on Human Rights),
Advisory Opinion OC-9/87, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 9, ¶ 28 (Oct. 6, 1987)
[hereinafter Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency]; Habeas Corpus in
Judicial Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) American Convention
on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 8,
¶ 25 (Jan. 30, 1987) [hereinafter Habeas Corpus in Judicial Emergency Situations].
310. Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94, supra
note 308, ¶ 4.
311. See Effective, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/effective (last visited July 10, 2017) (defining “effective” as “successful
in producing a desired or intended outcome,” which when used in the context of
IACtHR jurisprudence can be used to infer that a defendant’s anticipated outcome
in asserting due process rights is that those rights are fully respected with optimal
compliance to international human rights standards).
312. The Right to Information on Consular Assistance, supra note 309, ¶ 27.
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defendant facing the death penalty to prepare a defense.313 In
addition, in Larrañaga v. The Philippines, the Committee established
that imposition of the death penalty on an accused after the
conclusion of proceedings that failed to meet the requirements of
Article 14 amounts to inhuman treatment in violation of Article 7 of
the ICCPR.314 Violations of due process rights – especially when
occurring in the context of capital trials – do not necessarily have to
be “egregious” or “flagrant” to render the trial proceedings unfair.315
1. The ICC and Due Process Guarantees
The ICC guarantees defendants all the procedural protections
found in the ICCPR.316 To date, the ICC’s due process guarantees
offer the most advanced level of protection for defendants in
international criminal proceedings317 and have been praised by
experts and academics as representing an important achievement in
the “due process evolution of international criminal procedure.”318
Accordingly, it seems odd that the Court—while accepting the “due
313. Chan v. Guyana, Communication No. 913/2000, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/85/D/913/2000, ¶ 2.5 (Oct. 31, 2005).
314. Larrañaga v. The Philippines, Communication No. 1421/2005, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/87/D/1421/2005, Annex: Views of the Human Rights Committee under
article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, ¶ 7.11 (Sept. 14, 2006) (focusing on the legality of the
death penalty for one of multiple defendants convicted of kidnapping, rape, and
homicide when there was evidence of a violation of due process rights).
315. YVONNE MCDERMOTT, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS 161
(2016).
316. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 15, art.
67; see also Albin Eser, For Universal Jurisdiction: Against Fletcher’s
Antagonism, 39 TULSA L. REV., 955, 963 (2004) (“The Treaty of Rome contains the
most comprehensive list of due process protections which has so far been
promulgated.”).
317. See SALVATORE ZAPPALÀ, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS 25, 48 (2003) (emphasizing that reducing the rights of a person who
has been charged with a crime is irrational and paves the way of the accused with a
status of suspicion when, in fact, an individual often has more rights once
recognized as an accused).
318. See Angela Walker, The ICC Versus Libya: How to End the Cycle of
Impunity for Atrocity Crimes by Protecting Due Process Rights, 18 UCLA J. INT’L
L. FOREIGN AFF. 303, 337 (2014); Gregory S. Gordon, Toward an International
Criminal Procedure: Due Process Aspirations and Limitations, 45 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 635, 670 (2007).
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process” thesis, albeit reservedly319—set such a high threshold for
due process violations. In fact, it is significantly higher than the
threshold customarily applied by other international criminal or
regional human rights tribunals.320
An informal expert paper published on the Court’s website321
provides a list of indicia pointing to unwillingness or inability.
Unwillingness or inability can be determined by fact-finding
evidence relating to, inter alia, the legal regime of due process
standards and procedures, the rights of the accused, the legal regime
of access to evidence, the conditions of security for witnesses and
investigators, and other matters related to the fairness of the trial
proceedings.322
In addition, the paper provides some examples of relevant facts
and evidence that may be gathered for the purposes of demonstrating
unwillingness, particularly to establish that the proceedings lacked
independence and impartiality, and that they were conducted in a
manner inconsistent with an intent to bring the accused to justice.323
Such examples include the degree of independence of the judiciary,
patterns of political interference in the investigation and prosecution
of the alleged crimes, patterns of trials reaching preordained
outcomes, rapport between the authorities and the accused, and
commonality of purpose between suspected perpetrators and the
investigating authorities.324
The expert paper further provides a list of indicators that may not
319. See Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Judgment on Al-Senussi Appeal, supra note 18,
¶¶ 220, 229 (admitting that the concept of due process is relevant to the Court’s
consideration of unwillingness and recognition must be given to the ideologies of
Article 17(2), such as those recognized by international law regarding the conduct
of proceedings; however, the Court ultimately concludes that Article 17 was not
designed to make principles of human rights per se determinative of admissibility).
320. See, e.g., id. ¶ 191 (asserting that the lack of access to a lawyer violated Mr.
Al-Senussi’s right to a fair trial and requirements of Libyan law but still does not
meet the high threshold of requirements for the ICC to find Libya unwilling).
321. See Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-721-Anx9,
Annexe 9: Informal Expert paper: The principle of complementarity in practice,
28-31 (2003), https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ff5cf5/pdf/.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 28-31.
324. Id. at 29-30.
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be sufficient proof of unwillingness on their own, but may be
relevant when considered in context along with other indicators.
These include, inter alia, issues relating to due process, such as: an
uncharacteristic hastiness to conclude the proceedings; intimidation
of witnesses and victims; refusal to allow observers and trial
monitors into the proceedings; and the issuance of amnesties,
pardons, or grossly inadequate sentences that call into question the
genuineness of the proceedings.325
The paper makes no reference to “egregious” or “flagrant”
violations of due process rights, but appears to suggest that the more
indicators of unwillingness are factually established, the more likely
it is for the Court to find a case admissible.
Experts and academics have argued that, since the Appeals
Chamber in the Al-Sennussi case did not completely close the door
on the due process hypothesis, it is quite likely that a failure to allow
the accused adequate time and/or facilities to prepare his or her
defence, or the conduct of a trial in absentia, or failure to provide
access to a lawyer might easily meet the threshold set by the Appeals
Chamber, depending on the circumstances.326

VIII. ARTICLE 19(10) OF THE ROME STATUTE
AND THE ROLE OF PROSECUTOR’S DISCRETION
IN CHALLENGING THE ADMISSIBILITY
DECISION
A. PROSECUTOR’S DISCRETION TO REVIEW THE AL-SENUSSI CASE
Article 19(10) of the Rome Statute reads as follows:
[i]f the Court has decided that a case is inadmissible under article 17, the
Prosecutor may submit a request for a review of the decision when she is
fully satisfied that new facts have arisen which negate the basis on which
the case had previously been found inadmissible under article 17.327

The Prosecutor’s option to reopen a case previously found
325. See id. at 30-31.
326. See MCDERMOTT, SUPRA NOTE 315, AT 161.
327. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 15, art.
19(10).
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inadmissible has to date never been exercised, not even in the AlSenussi case.328 On March 30, 2016, I wrote a letter to the Prosecutor,
Fatou Bensouda, seeking clarification from her office on the review
of the Al-Senussi case.329 This communication had its own
challenges.
The legal framework of the ICC provides that submissions and
“communications” to the OTP from external stakeholders fall under
Article 15 of the Rome Statute. This Article refers specifically to
information related to preliminary examinations.330 However, there
was no other avenue available to officially submit communications
for purposes of review pursuant to Article 19(10) of the Rome
Statute. Therefore, I submitted the letter as an Article 15
Communication.331
Following the Appeals Chamber decision on inadmissibility in the
case against Abdullah Al-Senussi, the Pre-Trial Chamber officially
closed case ICC-01/11-01/11-567 on August 7, 2014.332 According to
the Pre-Trial Chamber decision, a request for review of the
328. See Fatou Bensouda, ICC Prosecutor, Statement to the United Nations
Security Council on the Situation in Libya, pursuant to UNSCR1970 (2011), ¶ 12
(Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/legalAidConsultations?name=161109-otpstat-UNSC1970 [hereinafter Bensouda Nov. 8, 2016] (confirming the position
expressed her previous report of May 26, 2016, and affirming that her Office
“remains of the view that no new facts have arisen which negate the basis on which
the Pre-Trial Chamber found Mr. Al-Senussi’s case inadmissible before the
Court”).
329. Letter from author to Fatou Bensouda, ICC Prosecutor (Mar. 30, 2016) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Letter to Bensouda].
330. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 15, art. 15
(“The Prosecutor may initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis of
information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. The Prosecutor shall
analyse the seriousness of the information received. For this purpose, he or she
may seek additional information from States, organs of the United Nations,
intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations, or other reliable sources
that he or she deems appropriate, and may receive written or oral testimony at the
seat of the Court.” Furthermore, the preliminary examination and evaluation of a
situation by the Office may be initiated on the basis of any information on crimes,
including information sent by individuals or groups, States, intergovernmental or
non-governmental organizations.).
331. See Letter to Bensouda, supra note 329.
332. See Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case
No. ICC-01/11-01/11-567, Decision following the Declaration of Inadmissibility
of the Case Against Abdullah Al-Senussi Before the Court, ¶ 6 (Aug. 7, 2014).

ss

ridan Pre

The She

130

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[33:1

admissibility decision can be made only via the OTP under Article
19(10) of the Rome Statute.333 Despite the abundance of available
evidence pointing to significant new developments in the domestic
proceedings, the OTP was simply not willing to concede that it had
erred in its assessment.
In an email dated February 26, 2016 addressed to my office, the
OTP stated that:
The OTP has continuously monitored the proceeding in the Al-Senussi
case and sought out relevant information to enable it to assess whether
there are new facts that may support an application for review under
article 19(10). We will continue to monitor the proceedings and review
new information as the case progresses.
In this regard, the OTP has carefully read and analyzed Dr. Mark Ellis’
report. Following our review, we have concluded that the report does not
alter our position that the OTP is not fully satisfied that new facts exist
which would warrant an application under article 19(10) at this time . . .

334

The OTP’s statement is disingenuous. The fact is that the Office
did not “continuously” monitor the trials.335 When I interviewed an
ICC Senior Trial Lawyer, for my report,336 he made it clear that the
OTP was not monitoring the case itself but relying on UNSMIL trial
observation notes as its main and possibly only source.
In a meeting with the Prosecutor and her staff, Mrs. Bensouda
reiterated to me that her office was still taking a “proactive
approach” and was “reviewing all available information relevant to
making a 19(10) application.”337 She further stated that her office
included an in-house Arabic expert and their analyses were based on
consultation with relevant stakeholders involved with the trials (e.g.,

333. See id.
334. Letter from Stanislas Talonsti, JCCD, to the Int’l Bar Ass’n. Office (Feb.
26, 2016) (on file with author)..
335. ELLIS, TRIAL OF THE LIBYAN REGIME, SURPA NOTE 80, AT 18.
336. Id. at 9 (analyzing firsthand accounts of trial observers that were assessed
and approved by legal professionals).
337. Interview with Mark S. Ellis, Exec. Dir., Int’l Bar Ass’n, in The Hague
(June 29, 2016).
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UNSMIL, the Prosecutor General in Libya, judges and lawyers).338
Most extraordinary was the OTP’s statement that the Prosecutor was
considering travel to Libya. This was inconsistent with prior and
more recent statements regarding the security situation in the
country.
The Prosecutor reiterated this position in a statement dated May
2016 to the UN Security Council when speaking about the inability
to investigate: “I must reiterate that until my team is able to carry out
investigations in Libya, and until the issue of resources is resolved,
the Office will simply be unable to advance the investigations as
rapidly as desired.”339 The Prosecutor further admitted in the same
statement that, “notwithstanding limited resources and the inability at
the present time to conduct in situ investigations in Libya,” her team
had been able to pursue leads and other avenues of collecting
evidence through their investigations.340
In her November 2016 address to the Security Council, the
Prosecutor confirmed that continued political instability and armed
conflict prevented her Office from conducting investigations within
Libyan territory, in relation to both existing and potential new
cases.341 Once again, the lack of direct monitoring was an insuperable
obstacle for the OTP, which was awaiting the full report of the UN
Support Mission in Libya on the conduct of the domestic trial, in
order to consider new potential information able to trigger an Article
19(10) review application in the Al-Senussi case.342
Most recently, in a speech given to the Security Council on May 8,
2017, the Prosecutor noted the significant deterioration of the
situation in Libya.343 She also admitted that it was still impossible for
338. Id.
339. Fatou Bensouda, ICC Prosecutor, Statement to the United Nations Security
Council on the Situation in Libya, pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011), ¶ 25 (May 26,
2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/legalAidConsultations?name=otp_statementlib260
52016 [hereinafter Bensouda May 26, 2016].
340. Id. ¶ 9.
341. See Bensouda Nov. 8, 2016, supra 328, ¶18.
342. See id. ¶ 12.
343. See Fatou Bensouda, ICC Prosecutor, Statement to the United Nations
Security Council on the Situation in Libya, pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011), ¶ 2
(May 8, 2017) [hereinafter Bensouda May 8, 2017] (indicating that Libya is at risk
of returning to a state of conflict, which would deteriorate the rule of law and order
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her investigators to carry out activities and collect evidence in
Libya.344 Although the OTP has explored innovative methods to
gather evidence from outside of the country through state
cooperation and the assistance of the Libyan Prosecutor-General,345
the Office clearly seems to be struggling to secure investigations
within the Libyan territory in a safe and secure manner, especially in
light of the current alarming security situation.
Yet, the Prosecutor has failed to exercise her power under Article
19(10), effectively supporting an Appeals Chamber decision that is
no longer reasonable, and indirectly galvanizing court proceedings
that were clearly in violation of international law. Instead of
reviewing ICC admissibility, she simply tried to encourage the
Libyan government to “do the right thing.” In her May 2016
statement to the Security Council, the Prosecutor stated as follows:
While the Appeals Chamber has recognized that, in the context of
admissibility proceedings, the ICC is not primarily called upon to decide
whether domestic proceedings violate certain requirements of human
rights or domestic law, it is incumbent upon the Government of National
Accord to ensure that the highest standards for investigations and
prosecutions are met.346

Guideline 12 of the UN Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors
provides that “[p]rosecutors shall, in accordance with the law,
perform their duties fairly, consistently and expeditiously, and
respect and protect human dignity and uphold human rights, thus
contributing to ensuring due process and the smooth functioning of
the criminal justice system.”347
In this regard, as the ICC Deputy Prosecutor highlighted in a 2014
ICTR Symposium in Arusha, “the Prosecutor must diligently and
effectively prosecute cases, but must do so in a manner that promotes
and possibly lead to widespread human rights violation against innocent citizens).
344. See id. ¶ 6.
345. See id. ¶ 7.
346. Bensouda May 26, 2016, supra note 339, ¶ 20.
347. Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, adopted by the Eighth United
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders,
Havana, Cuba, from 27 August to 7 September 1990, ¶12, at 3 (U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1).

ss

ridan Pre

The She

2017]

BEYOND A FLAWED TRIAL

133

fairness, in its broadest sense, to the accused.” (emphasis added)348
While the Prosecutor is a party to the proceedings, she is also
responsible to the accused for pursuing her case fairly.349 Her
ultimate responsibility is indeed to submit all relevant evidence in an
honest way to assist the Court in its goal to discover the truth.350
Similar statements regarding the role of the Prosecutor can be
found in the jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR. In Kupreškić,
Trial Chamber II noted that the Prosecutor is not only a party to
adversarial proceedings but also an organ of international criminal
justice.351 Its object, therefore, is not simply to secure a conviction
but to present the case for the Prosecution, which includes both
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, in order to assist the Chamber
to discover the truth in a judicial setting.352
Recalling the Tadić Rule 115 Decision before the ICTY,353 Judge
Shahabuddeen of the ICTR Appeals Chamber maintained that the
admission of “additional evidence” not available at trial cannot be
ignored when such material is decisive to avoid a miscarriage of
justice.354 Furthermore, the ICC Code of Conduct for the Office of
348. James K. Stewart, ICC Deputy Prosecutor, Fair Trial Rights under the
Rome Statute from a Prosecution Perspective 5, ICTR Symposium, Arusha,
Tanzania 5 (Nov. 7, 2014) (highlighting the duty of the Prosecutor to ensure
objectivity throughout the proceedings and avoid expressing any of her beliefs
publicly).
349. See id. (discussing the most fundamental right of the defendant, the
presumption of innocence, which is upheld by the Prosecutor through the
successful administration of justice).
350. See id. (describing the Code of Conduct used by the Prosecutor to reinforce
her responsibilities, which is created through the unification of multiple governing
sources).
351. Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16, Decision on Communications
Between the Parties and their Witnesses, ¶ 7(ii) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Sept. 21, 1998).
352. See id.
353. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Appellant’s Motion
for the Extension of the Time-limit and Admission of Additional Evidence
(unnumbered), ¶ 35 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 15, 1998).
354. Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision
(Prosecutor’s Request for Review or Reconsideration), Separate Opinion of Judge
Shahabuddeen, ¶ 49 (Mar. 31, 2000); Semanza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-9720-A, Decision, ¶¶ 44-45 (May 31, 2000); Gideon Boas et al., Appeals, Reviews,
and Reconsideration, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RULES AND
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the Prosecutor imposes a number of obligations on the ICC
Prosecutor, key among them being the obligation to “[r]espect
human rights and fundamental freedoms, the principle of equality
before the law, the presumption of innocence and right to a fair
trial.”355 In addition, Article 49 of the Code of Conduct stipulates that
the Prosecutor shall:
(a) conduct investigations with the goal of establishing the truth, and in
the interests of justice; (b) consider all relevant circumstances when
assessing evidence . . . ; (c) ensure that all necessary and reasonable
enquiries are made and the results disclosed in accordance with the
requirements of a fair trial, whether they point to the guilt or the
innocence of the suspect (emphasis added).356

The Prosecutor’s failure to challenge the admissibility decision of
the Appeals Chamber contravenes principles of good practice and
her obligations under the Code of Conduct and contradicts UN
Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors. Under the current ICC
regime, the Office of the Prosecutor is the only body that can
challenge admissibility decisions, as part of a duty to ensure the
proper and effective administration of justice.357 By allowing the
admissibility decision to stand, the Prosecutor risks the court’s
credibility and communicates a dangerous message: that certain
types of violations can and will be allowed to “slip through the
cracks.”
1. A Legitimacy Crisis Worsened: Impunity in Libya and Beyond
Considering the continuing dysfunction of the Libyan judicial
system, it is clear that the goals of “positive complementarity” have
not been realized in Libya.358 The incompetence of the current
PRINCIPLES 939, 952 (Göran Sluiter et al. eds., 2013).
355. Int’l Crim. Ct., Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor,
Introduction: Five Fundamental Rules, ¶ 4, OTP2013/024322 (Sept. 5, 2013).
356. Id. ¶ 49.
357. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 15, art. 19(10)
(stating that the Prosecutor may request an admissibility decision review when they
find that “new facts have arisen which negate the basis on which the case had
previously been found inadmissible”).
358. FIONA MANGAN & CHRISTINA MURTAUGH, SECURITY AND JUSTICE IN
POSTREVOLUTION
LIBYA
31
(Peaceworks,
2014),
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Libyan judicial system is manifest in a number of ways, including:
the failure to incorporate international core crimes and international
human rights law into the provisions of Libya’s penal law; the
persistence of militia justice, legal impunity and lawlessness; the
absence of security and public order; and a lack of trained judicial
actors.359 Many courts have suspended their activities due to the
targeting of judges and prosecutors.360
The overall demise of Libya’s judicial systems continues unabated
today. Libya’s domestic judicial system “has collapsed in several
parts of the country. It is unable to provide recourse for victims of
abuse.”361 Libya has fallen to an all-time low as political elites,
unable to agree on even a governmental structure, deploy armed
militias to control territory and economic assets.362 The nature and
seat of government continues to be contested.363 The collapse of
central government and continuing armed conflict has eliminated any
appearance of law and order in many parts of the country.364
In February 2016, the OHCHR observed that,
[t]he Libyan judicial system has been the target of crippling, violent
attacks with actors such as judges and prosecutors being subject to
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW100-Security-and-Justice-in-PostRevolution-Libya.pdf.
359. Zawati, supra note 17, at 248.
360. Libya: New ICC Investigation Needed Amid Crisis, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(May
11,
2015),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/11/libya-new-iccinvestigation-needed-amid-crisis (noting that the breakdown in rule of law has
“contributed to a culture of impunity and . . . lawlessness”).
361. Id.
362. The Current Situation in Libya: A USIP Fact Sheet, U.N. INST. PEACE
(May 16, 2016), https://www.usip.org/publications/the-current-situation-in-libya
(describing how Libya’s issues are further exacerbated by ISIS and other violent
extremists “exploiting” the power vacuum to “expand operations.”).
363. William Danvers, Toward a More Perfect Union: The Struggle for Security
in
Libya,
CTR.
AM.
PROGRESS
(Dec.
8,
2016),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2016/12/08/294447/towa
rd-a-more-perfect-union-the-struggle-for-security-in-libya (explaining that the
internationally recognized “Government of National Accord” continues to be
challenged by the “House of Representatives” and the “General National
Congress” factions).
364. Libya: Flawed Trial of Gaddafi Officials, supra note 76 (describing how
two rival “de facto” governments are attempting to control different sections of the
country).
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killings, assaults, abductions, and threats. Such attacks have caused the
system to come to a halt in many areas of Libya, in particular the eastern
and central regions, and have compromised the functioning of the courts
that remain open.365

In addition to militia intimidation and interference, the
International Crisis Group described “a parallel judicial system in
which independent armed groups assumed state functions, arresting,
detaining and kidnapping individuals without judicial oversight or
accountability.”366 The use of detention centers outside the legal
framework by armed actors not accountable to the state is a
particular challenge for the Libyan justice system.367
An additional challenge comes from the Islamic State (ISIS),
which is expanding operations in Libya.368 The continued lack of
state authority in most parts of Libya has resulted in both the
expansion of ISIS and a tragically deteriorating humanitarian
situation.369 The country has become a marketplace for the trafficking
of human beings and the smuggling of migrants, thus leading to a
significant risk that “these activities could further provide fertile
ground for organised crime and terrorist networks in Libya.”370 In
addition, the Prosecutor said her Office remained concerned about
ongoing civilian deaths as a result of reported executions by ISIS.371
365. Investigation by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights on Libya, Human Rights Council, Office of the U.N. High Comm’r
for Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/CRP.3, at 55 (Feb. 15, 2016),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/LY/A_HRC_31_47_E.pdf (discussing
how “conflict-related detainees . . . remain without access to judicial review” and
there is a general “lack of genuine access to justice.”).
366. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, supra note 158, at 20; see also
International Crisis Group, Trial by Error: Justice in Post-Qadhafi Libya, Report
No. 140 at 18 (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/57ee8f9f4.pdf.
367. Investigation by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights on Libya, supra note 365, at 55.
368. The Current Situation in Libya: A USIP Fact Sheet, supra note 362
(highlighting how Libya is “trapped in a spiral of deteriorating security, economic
crisis, and political deadlock”).
369. Libya must have functioning government to end ‘tragic’ humanitarian
situation, Security Council told, UN NEWS CENTRE (June 6, 2016),
www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=54150#.WIYWYtKLTct.
370. Bensouda May 8, 2017, supra note 343, ¶ 27.
371. Bensouda May 26, 2016, supra note 339, ¶ 21(stating that the Prosecutor’s
office was attempting to contribute to resolution of the Libyan conflict by
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According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, violence and ongoing political instability has
affected more than three million people across the country.372 As of
late 2016, an estimated 2.44 million people were classified as
internally displaced, refugees, asylum-seekers, migrants, or nondisplaced but conflict-affected persons in need of protection and
some form of humanitarian assistance.373
Threat remains real and makes it increasingly difficult for Libya to
emerge from conflict or for fully functioning judicial institutions to
take root. In this regard, the ICC Prosecutor has recently affirmed
that reports indicate that the country is at risk of returning to
widespread conflict.374 She is correct in asserting that such an
outcome “will surely aggravate a climate of impunity, which could in
turn lead to widespread human rights abuses and violations of
international humanitarian law.”375

IX. CONCLUSION
After years of failing to define the precise relationship between
Article 17 and due process rights, the Appeals Chamber, in the AlSenussi case, took a first timid step in establishing the link between
complementarity and human rights. Even though the court remained
consistent in its position that unwillingness generally applies to
proceedings that would lead to a suspect evading justice, the Appeals
Chamber—for the first time ever—accepted that there is a
correlation between human rights and unwillingness under Article
17(2)(c) of the Statute.376 Some have argued that the Appeals
Chamber’s judgment should be celebrated, as it demonstrates that
there are certain violations of due process rights that the court simply

investigating high-level officials).
372. Progress in Libya marred by ongoing volatile security situation and
economic challenges – UN envoy to Security Council, UN NEWS CENTRE (Sept. 13,
2016), www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=54913#.WIYi8NKLTcs.
373. Id.
374. Bensouda May 26, 2016, supra note 339, ¶ 3.
375. Id.
376. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11 OA 6, Judgment on AlSenussi Appeal, ¶¶ 17, 2, 190, 230(3).
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will not tolerate.377
However, the Appeals Chamber was eager to limit the relationship
between human rights and complementarity, by stating that
violations of due process rights would only bear on findings of
admissibility if they were “so egregious that the proceedings can no
longer be regarded as being capable of providing any genuine form
of justice to the suspect.”378 In fact, in the view of the Appeals
Chamber, even if the lack of access to legal representation during the
investigation stage of the proceedings violated Al-Senussi’s right to a
fair trial, such violations would not reach the high threshold for
finding that Libya is unwilling genuinely to investigate or prosecute
Al-Senussi.379
As demonstrated above, the terms “egregious,” “flagrant,” and
“serious” have been used in international law to denote violations of
the highest degree of seriousness.380 Notwithstanding the abundance
of legal instruments foreseeing “grave” or “gross” violations of
human rights, there is no uniform understanding of what constitutes a
“serious violation” and hardly any discussion in international
practice with regard to the meaning and legal value of this
expression.381 International and regional bodies have not applied a
coherent language in this field, but conversely have utilized the terms
“gross,” “grave” and “serious” interchangeably, without necessarily
specifying the distinctive features of each term.382 Furthermore,
377. See Ondřej Svaček, The Human Rights Dimension of the ICC’s
Complementarity Regime, 6 CZECH Y. PUB. & PR. INT’L. L. 273-88 (2015).
378. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11 OA 6, Judgment on AlSenussi Appeal, ¶¶ 17, 2, 190, 230(3).
379. Id. ¶ 191(going onto the say that because Libya assured the Court that AlSenussi’s trial would not have commenced without legal representation for AlSenussi, there was no intent to deny him access to a lawyer).
380. Karimova, supra note 284, at 6.
381. Ilia M. Siatitsa, Serious violations of human rights: The emergence of a
new legal regime?, ANNUAL EDINBURGH POSTGRADUATE LAW CONFERENCE 2014,
www.lawphdconference.ed.ac.uk/2014/11/19/serious-violations-of-human-rightsthe-emergence-of-a-new-legal-regime (last visited Apr. 11, 2017) (discussing how
there is “hardly any reflection in practice” regarding the meaning of “serious
violation,” but that “serious” indicates that a particular violation “is somehow of a
greater concern” than less serious violations).
382. Karimova, supra note 284, at 12 (stating that the definition could be
clarified reviewing “soft law instruments” such as declarations, guidelines, and
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international jurisprudence shows that no systematic rule makes it
possible to distinguish less serious from more serious breaches of
human rights.383 Most regional human rights tribunals have in fact
rarely applied this distinction in the course of assessing the fairness
of trial proceedings.384
Thus, the Appeals Chamber’s determination sets a very high
threshold of proof for establishing that a violation of due process
rights amounts to unwillingness under Article 17(2)(c). There is
nothing in the text of the Rome Statute, nor in the drafting history, to
indicate that the relationship between human rights and
complementarity is to be defined on the basis of distinguishing
between “ordinary” and “egregious” violations of due process. In
fact, as demonstrated above, the drafting history suggests that the
threshold for any such violations—especially in the context of
determining independence and impartiality—is to be established in
regard to the principles of due process recognized by international
law.385
Fair trial rights under international law have been codified under a
number of human rights instruments and are considered jus cogens
norms.386 Issues such as limited access to counsel, insufficient time
and facilities for lawyers to confer with clients, and limited access to
evidence, all of which have been widely reported in the context of
the national proceedings in Libya,387 would amount to violations of
expert opinions).
383. Id. at 21 (noting that the International Court of Justice has failed to draw
this distinction, while the African Court and Commission (and other regional
bodies) have attempted to categorize violations).
384. Id. at 21-25 (comparing the African regional bodies’ attempts to create
distinctions in cases with “numerous systems,” the European analysis of cases
involving violations against individuals, and the Inter-American system’s
interchangeable use of adjectives when describing violations).
385. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 15, art.
17(2) (stating that a violation is determined based on proceedings clearly
conducted to shield the person from actual responsibility, “unjustified delay in the
proceedings,” and blatant partiality in the proceedings).
386. Robinson, supra note 259, at 10-11.
387. See ELLIS, TRIAL OF THE LIBYAN REGIME, supra note 80, at 37 (“Trial
observers reported a number of instances in which defence lawyers were not given
adequate time to consult with their clients, and where such time was allotted,
prison security personnel listened in on meetings. Defence lawyers complained of
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due process under Article 14 of the ICCPR, without having to qualify
as “egregious” or more serious than an “ordinary” breach.388
In addition, and as seen above, academic and expert opinion
further suggests that issues relating to due process, such as a failure
to allow the accused adequate time and/or facilities to prepare his or
her defence, and lack of access to counsel, are relevant indicators of
“unwillingness” under Article 17(2)(c).389
Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber accepted that the issue of legal
representation in Mr. Al-Senussi’s case—which was still in the early
stages of exhibiting signs of concern—could amount to a violation of
due process in the future.390 The court stated, “[S]hould it later
become clear that the issue of legal representation cannot be
resolved, this may be a basis for the Prosecutor to seek, pursuant to
Article 19(10) of the Statute, a review of the decision that the case
against Mr. Al-Senussi is inadmissible.”391 It is important to note that
the Appeals Chamber concentrated on the continuity of the breach.392
This indicates that the Appeals Chamber regards the lack of access to
counsel as a sufficiently “egregious” breach that it continued to be an
issue throughout the proceedings. Thus, even with the high threshold
set by the Appeals Chamber in its Al-Senussi admissibility decision,
additional developments in the domestic proceedings occurring after
the date of the decision highlight the need for a fresh assessment of
admissibility.
However, despite the plethora of available evidence pointing to
decisive new developments in the domestic proceedings, the OTP
this frequently, both privately and during court sessions.”).
388. Id. at 11-12 (noting that although Article 14 lists the “‘minimum guarantees
of fairness,’” a hearing’s fairness will be “assessed on its merits, and based on the
particular circumstances of each case”).
389. See MCDERMOTT, supra note 315, at 157-62 (citing scholarship on ICC
“complementarity” and the necessity of “intent” to deny due process protection in
domestic proceedings).
390. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11 OA 6, Judgment on the
Appeal of Mr Abdullah Al-Senussi Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of
11 October 2013 Entitled “Decision on the Admissibility of the Case Against
Abdullah Al-Senussi” (Judgement on Al-Senussi Appeal), ¶ 201 (July 24, 2014),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_06755.PDF.
391. Id. ¶ 201.
392. Id.
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was simply not willing to concede that it erred in its assessment.393
The Prosecutor’s responsibility to prosecute cases in a manner to
promote fairness to the accused should have promptly led her to
consider the new facts arising after the admissibility decision in the
Al-Senussi case. These facts clearly negate the basis on which the
case was previously found inadmissible for the purposes of Article
17 of the Rome Statute, and plainly show that domestic proceedings
in Libya can no longer be regarded as being capable of providing any
genuine form of justice to the accused.
This article has demonstrated that additional evidence, which
became available throughout and after the conclusion of the domestic
proceedings, made it abundantly clear that Mr. Al-Senussi’s lack of
legal representation was not resolved and, in fact, was a problem that
persisted throughout the proceedings.394 This one issue, along with
others analyzed in more detail in this article, significantly
undermined the fairness of the proceedings. It is true that not all the
regime trial procedures failed to meet international standards.395 My
own report acknowledges that judges and lawyers actively attempted
to safeguard defendants’ rights, that judges made commendable
efforts to ensure proceedings were handled with professionalism, and
that the judges made a significant effort to promote the appearance of
equality of arms during formal proceedings.396
However, although attempts were made to comply with
international fair trial standards and impartiality, they were simply
not met. If the deficiencies noted in various reports do not, as stated
by the OTP, satisfy “that new facts exist which would warrant an
application under Article 19(10) at this time,” then what new facts
would warrant such an application?397
In this respect, the ICC Prosecutor has lately opened a small
window to the possible opportunity to determine whether new
information or facts have arisen that could trigger an Article 19(10)
393. See Libya: New ICC Investigation Needed Amid Crisis, supra note 360
(reporting that despite sending a letter to OTP regarding new facts in the case, the
prosecutor would only concede to continued monitoring of the case).
394. See ELLIS, TRIAL OF THE LIBYAN REGIME, supra note 80, at 38-39.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 26-27, 41-43.
397. Bensouda May 8, 2017, supra note 343, ¶ 22.
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application for review of the Al-Senussi case.398 As this article has
undeniably demonstrated, and what the Prosecutor has obstinately
refused to acknowledge for years, Libya has fallen short of
international fair trial standards.
Now more than ever, in the face of the tangibly worsening
situation in Libya that is heavily affecting the ability of the country
to conduct proceedings in full respect for the rights of the accused,
the Prosecutor is called upon to take action and finally let the AlSenussi case fall within the ICC jurisdiction.
In spite of the complexities involved with the regime trials, the
only conclusion to be reached is that international standards have
been unduly compromised. There is still a danger that the OTP is
being seen as trying to “whitewash” the domestic trials so as to
uphold its early position on admissibility, a position that seems
untenable in light of new evidence at hand.399 In addition, by
encouraging Libya’s domestic proceedings, despite evidence of flaws
to the legal system, the OTP dramatically contributed to the ICC’s
ongoing legitimacy crisis, exposing the Court to risk that it will be
perceived as an institution that condones the violation of due process
rights. The court’s determination in the Al-Senussi case is
inconsistent with the intentions of the original drafters of the Statute,
the practice of other tribunals, and general principles of international
human rights law.
In fact, the customary nature of fair trial and due process standards
has been abundantly recognized in a number of human rights
instruments and confirmed in various judgments and decisions of
international courts and tribunals, to the extent that they have even
achieved the status and imperative force of jus cogens norms.400
Thus, Libya is bound to respect, protect and fulfil human rights
standards within its jurisdiction, including the right to have access to
legal representation and to be tried before an independent and
impartial court or tribunal, the right to adequate time and facilities
for the preparation of the defense, and the right to obtain the
examination of witnesses on the accused’s behalf and to challenge
398. Id.
399. Id. ¶¶ 3, 20-27.
400. Robinson, supra note 259, at 4.
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witnesses testifying against him.
It seems clear that the ICC has exhibited a tendency to focus more
on its role in catalyzing domestic prosecutions than it has in ensuring
international standards of fairness at the domestic level. Thus, “let
flawed trials be” can be the mantra of positive complementarity.401
The ICC’s endorsement of “positive complementarity” is a lofty
pursuit. It nobly endeavours to enhance international assistance to
national jurisdictions in order to strengthen the willingness and
ability of those jurisdictions to conduct the investigation and
prosecution of ICC crimes. I have personally advocated for an
expansion of domestic war crimes tribunals.402
However, it is clear that in the case of Libya, policies for the sake
of “positive complementarity” took precedence over the ICC’s
primary mandate to challenge impunity. Consequently, the OTP
facilitated the weakening of the Libyan judicial system. The Court’s
incoherent approach in the admissibility decision, compounded by
the continuing legitimization of the Libyan domestic trials, can only
raise doubts surrounding the politics of the ICC. Even for the most
avid supporters of the ICC, its involvement in Libya illustrates the
ICC’s severe limitations in creating positive effects for post-conflict
justice and, consequently, worsens the ICC’s ongoing legitimacy
crisis.
Some argue that there should be a level of leniency towards due
process rights, allowing “imperfect” or “flawed trials” that do not
meet international standards just for the sake of sparking a national
conversation about judicial reform.403 Yet in Libya, where the trials
concerned were beyond flawed, and riddled with due process
violations, it is hard to argue that allowing “Libyans to try Libyans”
brought any of the aforementioned satisfactory outcomes. Rather, as
the former Libyan Justice Minister Salah al-Marghani, who was in
401. See Mégret & Samson, supra note 50, at 577-81.
402. See ELLIS, SOVEREIGNTY AND JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 2, 11 (discussing
how domestic human rights bodies “can play an indisputable role in post-conflict
reconciliation,” citing Serbia and Iraq and contexts in which a stronger domestic
mechanism would have served reconciliation efforts).
403. Mégret & Samson, supra note 50, at 578 (arguing that if Gaddafi has been
tried at The Hague, the public would have perceived his trail as “preferential
treatment” and not true accountability to the citizens he harmed).
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power when the trial began, stated, Libyans have been “deprived of
finding out the truth in a fair trial to judge an era of severe
tyranny.”404 Indeed, the NGO Libyan Lawyers for Justice in Libya
(LFJL) explored how the Gaddafi trial “prevented the establishment
of a detailed account of the truth behind the serious human rights
violations considered during the proceedings.”405 It failed “to
determine individual criminal responsibility for the atrocious crimes
or to substantively evidence the chain of command which enabled
such acts to be committed.”406 Instead, many of the defendants were
held responsible by association for crimes attributed to the Gaddafi
administration, without evidencing their individual involvement with
specific acts.”407
Even top Gaddafi officials found themselves immune. According
to news reports, in July 2016, the UN-backed Libyan Government
granted amnesty to a number of individuals, including Saif Al-Islam
Gaddafi.408 This comes amid a wider amnesty granted to Gaddafi-era
prisoners by the UN-backed government to promote reconciliation.409
Thus, as argued by the LFJL Director, Elham Saudi:
The lack of accountability in Libya remains a huge concern. Although
human rights violations were part of the negotiations of the political
dialogues led by the United Nations, amnesty laws remain on the books in
Libya. The recent draft constitution also proposes further entrenchment of
such measures. These amnesties are not only inconsistent with
international law, but undermine efforts to transition Libya to a state

404. Rana Jawad, Libya death sentences cast long shadow over rule of law,
BBC NEWS (Aug. 12, 2015), www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-33855860.
405. LFJL is concerned that the absence of fair trial standards during Gaddafi
official trials will jeopardise the right of victims to justice, LAWYERS FOR JUSTICE
IN LIBYA, (July 28, 2015), [hereinafter Lawyers for Justice in Libya]
www.libyanjustice.org/news/news/post/201-lawyers-for-justice-in-libya-lfjl-isconcerned-that-the-absence-of-fair-trial-standards-during-gaddafi-official-trialswill-jeopardise-the-right-of-victims-to-justice.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Chris Stephen, Gaddafi son Saif al-Islam ‘freed after death sentence
quashed’, GUARDIAN (July 7, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2016/jul/07/gaddafi-son-saif-al-islam-freed-after-death-sentence-quashed.
409. Id.
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where impunity is no longer tolerated.410

Furthermore, Libyan authorities have demonstrated their
unwillingness to combat impunity for serious crimes committed by
militias. Indeed, Libya’s adoption of Law No. 38 of 2012 concerning
procedures for the transitional period provides a blanket immunity
for persons who carried out the task of toppling the Gaddafi
regime.411 Similarly, Law No. 17 of 2012 regarding the rules of
national reconciliation and transitional justice limits the cases to be
addressed by the Fact-Finding and Reconciliation Commission to
crimes allegedly associated with the former regime, while crimes
committed by insurgents, armed groups and the transitional
government’s agents remain unconsidered.412 Thus, rather than
improving national judicial mechanisms in Libya, the Memorandum
has created an immunity gap between rebels and Gaddafi officials.
Ultimately, such a lack of accountability jeopardized the right of
victims to truth, reconciliation and justice, and in consequence,
neither delivered on the ICC’s promise to effectively challenge the
sham proceedings nor on the principles of transitional justice. As an
international legal institution, the ICC’s effectiveness depends on
maintaining the support of states as well as providing justice. Even if
the sole purpose of the ICC is to prevent impunity, this can only be
done through the course of fair, independent, and impartial
proceedings. In this regard, while we may allow slight imperfections,
the Al-Senussi case was beyond flawed and requires review.

410. Lawyers for Justice in Libya, supra note 405.
411. Zawati, supra note 17, at 230 (stating that these laws are “retributive rather
than constructive” and “ironically” led to the uprising against the Gaddafi regime).
412. Id.
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